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Since the introduction of Sustainability and Transformation Plans in 2015, there has been an 
increasing emphasis in the English NHS on developing geographically based partnerships 
across the NHS and local government, where commissioners and providers take a co-ordinated 
approach to services, agree system-wide priorities, and plan collectively how to improve 
population health. This policy is a continuation of the long term direction of travel which seeks 
to improve inter-organisational collaboration in the planning and provision of NHS services. 
However, achieving system-wide collaboration through Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (STPs) and Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) is also a fundamental shift away from 
the architecture of the internal NHS market, most specifically organisational autonomy 
designed to facilitate competition and the separation of commissioners and providers, albeit 
without (as yet) any change to legislation.   
As STPs and ICSs are not currently statutory bodies, their success is determined by the 
willingness of actual statutory bodies to work together to agree strategies which may be against 
their own direct interest, within a wider framework which continues to hold individual 
organisations to account for their own performance. Successful system working also depends 
on securing the commitment of key system partners from outside the NHS, such as local 
government, who are subject to separate institutional contexts regarding priorities, ways of 
working and financial rules.   
In order to understand how effective these new forms of collaboration are in achieving their 
goals, there was a need to investigate how STPs and ICSs are developing locally, including the 
development of leadership and co-operative arrangements, the way system partners are 
reconciling individual and system roles and the way local priorities are being reconciled with 
system priorities. This interim report presents findings from the first stage of this research.  
Aims  
The objectives of the study are to find out: 
1) How the local leadership and cooperative arrangements with stakeholders (statutory, 
independent and community-based, including local authorities) are governed in the light of 
the ICS governance recommendations in the LTP. How statutory commissioning 
organisations including local authorities are facilitating local strategic decisions and their 
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implementation; and whether different types of commissioning function are evolving at 
different system levels.  
2) Whether ICSs are able to allocate resources more efficiently across sectoral boundaries and 
bring their local health economies into financial balance.  
3) How individual organisations are reconciling their role in an ICS with their individual roles, 
accountabilities and statutory responsibilities.  
4) How national regulators are responding to the changes in modes of planning and 
commissioning and actual service configurations, in the light of the changed priorities for 
these regulators set out in the LTP. 
5) Which mechanisms are used to commission services in ICSs. In particular, how is 
competition used to improve quality and/or value for money of services; and are more 
complex forms of contract (such as alliancing) being used? How are local organisations 
reconciling new service configurations with current/evolving pricing structures, and thus 
how are financial incentives being used? 
6) How locality priorities, including those of local authorities, are reconciled with the wider 
priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. In particular, how is co-ordination achieved between 
STP and ICS plans, local priorities and existing programmes of work such as any local new 
models of care? 
Design and methods  
The study consists of three in-depth case studies to investigate the development of STPs and 
ICSs. Each case study consists of a system and its partners. During the first stage of fieldwork 
one of the case study sites was an ICS and two were STPs.  
This report is based on findings from the first phase of fieldwork which was undertaken 
between December 2019 and March 2020. Fieldwork was halted prematurely in March 2020 
before the first phase was complete due to the emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
The main form of data was interviews with the Director level staff and/or senior managers who 
were responsible for representing each member in the system, and with the system leaders. The 
interviews explored interviewees’ experience of decision making in systems, the reconciliation 
of individual roles, accountabilities and statutory responsibilities with system roles, the impact 
of financial mechanisms on system working, reconciliation of local and system priorities, co-
ordination between place and system, and system impact on resource allocation across sectoral 
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boundaries and the achievement of financial balance. Twenty eight interviews were conducted 
in this phase of the research.  
We analysed local documents to understand governance structures, decisions being made in 
systems and strategic plans. We observed eight meetings during the first phase of the research 
(three in Case Study 1, three in Case Study 2 and two in Case Study 3). All meetings were 
system level meetings, of the Partnership Board or significant system forums. The purpose of 
observing a variety of meetings was to supplement the information we obtained from 
interviews with the system partners. 
Results 
The first phase of our research suggests that systems are still developing relationships and 
refining the governance arrangements to allow system partners to work effectively together to 
achieve their aims using the system form. Overall, systems are a challenging environment in 
which to make binding decisions, particularly those of a contentious nature. System partners 
are seeking to reconcile potentially competing interests in their governance arrangements: 
balancing representation, inclusivity and consensus with the need to act; the accommodation 
of both cross cutting pieces of work and issues specific to certain groups of organisations; and 
of the principle of subsidiarity and the need for system oversight. Measures being introduced 
include proposals to streamline membership of governance forums, the incorporation of 
existing governance architecture into system structures, and the recruitment of system leaders 
who hold positions of authority in statutory bodies within the system.  
The development of system governance which ‘goes with the grain’ of the local context appears 
an important way of enabling the full engagement of local government in systems and places, 
and facilitating governance arrangements which are clear and functional.  Interviewees 
acknowledged that it remains challenging to get the division of responsibilities “right” between 
systems and places. Not all commissioning could be carried out at ICS level, and it was 
necessary to make commissioning decisions at place level too. It was anticipated the 
progression towards a single CCG per system would lead to the delegation of some 
commissioning decisions to place level. At place level, agreements to formalise co-operative 
working and agreements to share risk, such as Alliance agreements, are under discussion but 
not yet widely implemented.  
We found a broad acceptance among partners of the need to work collaboratively together, and 
to take decisions in the best interest of the system. However, some interviewees still doubted 
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that, given the current legislative environment, partners would prioritise the interests of the 
system above individual roles, accountabilities and statutory responsibilities when faced with 
decisions significantly against organisational interests.  It appears that a shift from competition 
to a collaborative ethos in the NHS is underway, but this is a long-term undertaking.  Local 
government bodies were concerned about their potential exposure to financial risk, and loss of 
control over limited council resources.  
The question of how systems were accountable, to whom and for what was far from settled. 
The developing landscape has made things unclear on the ground for NHS partners, with the 
potential for confusion in the way responsibilities flow between the system, the regulator, 
providers and places. 
Systems were starting to make use of opportunities to agree the allocation of central resources 
between partners, to develop shared resources in ways that had not been possible before, and 
to explore novel and unique initiatives based on system partnerships, but these types of 
initiatives were not yet common practice. At the time of the fieldwork, action to achieve long 
term financial sustainability in the case studies had not been agreed or implemented. 
Conclusions 
The governance structures of STPs and ICSs are complex and making decisions through these 
structures can be difficult. System partners are keen to embrace collaboration, and systems are 
starting to make use of opportunities to agree the allocation of resources and to develop shared 
resources in ways that had not been possible before. It is not clear how however, ICSs and 
STPs, in their current form, are addressing contentious issues such as the need to achieve 
financial sustainability. System working is not aided by accountability relationships that are 
unclear to some.  It is important that system governance structures ‘go with the grain’ of the 
local context, in order to facilitate meaningful engagement of local government, and to improve 
the clarity and functionality of decision making processes.  The division of functions between 
systems and places is not straightforward. As CCGs merge to become coterminous with 
systems, there is a need for clear arrangements for the necessary commissioning functions at 






Alliance agreement - An NHS Alliance agreement overlays but does not replace existing 
service contracts. It brings providers together around a common aspiration for joint working 
across the system, setting out shared objectives and principles, and a set of shared governance 
rules allowing providers to come together to take decisions  
 
Better Care Fund - A single pooled budget for health and social care services to work more 
closely together in local areas, based on a plan agreed between the NHS and local authorities  
Blended payments - A holistic blended payment model comprising a fixed element with a 
quality/outcomes based element, a risk sharing element and/or a variable payment to encourage 
providers and commissioners to adopt cost effective, joined up approaches 
Block contract - The NHS payment system under which a healthcare provider receives a lump 
sum payment to provide a service irrespective of the number of patients treated  
Care Quality Commission (CQC) - The independent regulator of quality of all health and social 
care services in England 
Commissioner Sustainability Fund (CSF)- System of cash rewards for CCGs in return for 
meeting financial targets 
Committee in common – an approach to co-ordinated decision making across organisations, by 
which multiple organisations establish their own committee with delegated authority to make 
certain decisions, which meet at the same time, with the same remit, and where possible 
identical membership to co-ordinate decisions. Each committee remains accountable to its own 
board.   
Devolution Agreement – An agreement involving the transfer, concurrent exercise, or joint 
exercise of functional responsibilities from a public authority (which could include a 
Government department or NHS England) to a local party  
GP Federation - a group of general practices or surgeries forming an organisational entity and 
working together within the local area 
Health and Wellbeing Board -  a formal committee of a Local Authority, which has a statutory 
duty, with CCGs, to produce a joint strategic needs assessment and a joint health and wellbeing 





Individual Control Total – Annual financial target that NHS organisations must achieve to 
unlock access to national funding and other financial benefits 
 
Lead contracting – a contractual configuration where one provider organisation holds a service 
contract with NHS commissioners and sub contracts part of its performance to other 
organisations  
 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)- A document that records the common intent and 
agreement between two or more parties. It defines the working relationships and guidelines 
between collaborating groups or parties.  
 
NHS England/NHS E - An executive non-departmental public body responsible for directly 
commissioning primary care and specialist services and overseeing the commissioning 
arrangements created by the HSCA 2012. From 1 April 2019, NHS England and NHS 
Improvement are working together as a new single organisation (NHSEI) 
 
NHS Improvement/NHS I - An executive non-departmental public body responsible for 
overseeing NHS foundation trusts, NHS trusts and independent providers, helping them give 
patients consistently safe, high quality, compassionate care within local health systems that are 
financially sustainable. From 1 April 2019, NHS England and NHS Improvement are working 
together as a new single organisation  (NHSEI) 
 
NHSEI - From 1 April 2019, NHS England and NHS Improvement are working together as a 
new single organisation  (NHSEI) 
 
PbR - Payment by Results: the payment system relying on national tariffs for certain HRGs 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee -  a Local Authority Committee, required by the Local 
Government Act 2000, for the scrutiny of the provision of local health services  
Provider Sustainability Fund  (PSF)- System of  cash rewards in return for meeting financial 
targets 
System  control total - annual NHS financial target for an STP or ICS area, based on the sum 
of individual organisation control totals 
 




1.1 Policy Background 
Since the introduction of Sustainability and Transformation Plans in 2015, there has been an 
increasing emphasis in the English NHS on developing geographically based partnerships 
across NHS and local government, take a co-ordinated approach to services, agree system-wide 
priorities, and plan collectively how to improve population health. This interim report relates 
to the findings from the first stage of a research study to investigate the developing architecture 
of system management through Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) and 
Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) in order to find out how effective these new forms of 
collaboration are in achieving their goals, and what factors influence this. 
The establishment of NHS structures at a regional level and a reliance on collaboration are not 
novel approaches. Firstly, an ‘intermediate tier’, which is shaped by central policy-making 
decisions whilst overseeing the organisation of local health services, has been a feature for 
nearly the entire history of the NHS (Lorne et al., 2019). Spatial ‘regions’ have also been a near 
constant – if constantly changing – feature within the organisation of healthcare. Such 
intermediate bodies may be statutory or non-statutory, and may at times have greater autonomy 
(decentralist) or may operate merely as administrative layers (de-concentration) (ibid.). 
Secondly, alongside the use of market mechanisms to promote competition in the NHS since 
the late 1980s, there has been an ongoing reliance on collaboration. Co-operation between 
organisations is acknowledged as an ‘essential behaviour’ in the provision of ‘seamless and 
sustainable care’ to patients (Department of Health, 2010e, p12). The need for co-operation is 
enshrined in The Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012) in the requirement that the 
economic regulator is responsible for promoting co-operation, and that NHS commissioners 
should ensure that the appropriate levels of both competition and cooperation exist in their 
local health economies  
 
However, the development of STPs and ICSs has marked a fundamental shift in emphasis in 
NHS policy, moving away from the architecture of the internal NHS market, where 
organisational autonomy was designed to promote competition and the separation of 
commissioners and providers, albeit without (as yet) any change to legislation.  System 
working in STPs and ICSs elevates partnership working alongside the interests of individual 
organisations, prioritises collaboration over competition and market mechanisms, and 
facilitates greater collaboration across all partners involved in population health.  Early 
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guidance relating to Sustainability and Transformation Plans (which would later become 
Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships) emphasised the involvement of all ‘local 
leaders coming together as a team, developing a shared vision with the local community, which 
also involves local government as appropriate; [and] programming a coherent set of activities 
to make it happen’ (NHS England et al., 2015). ICSs later emerged out of a series of policy 
documents and announcements as more advanced local partnerships which ‘bring together 
local organisations in a pragmatic and practical way to deliver the ‘triple integration’ of 
primary and specialist care, physical and mental health services, and health with social care’ 
(NHS, 2019a, p. 29). There are currently 42 local systems in place. As of December 2020, 29 
of these systems were ICSs, and it was expected the remaining 13 STPs would mature to 
become ICSs by April 2021. 
The establishment of STPs and ICSs takes place within a wider context which is not necessarily 
supportive of the partnership approach. Collaboration across NHS bodies is situated in the 
residual wider institutional context in the NHS of hierarchical control and market incentives. 
As STPs and ICSs are not currently statutory bodies their success is determined by the 
willingness of NHS bodies within the system to work together to agree strategies for resource 
utilisation which may be against their own direct interest, within a wider framework which 
continues to hold individual organisations to account for their own performance. A further 
important element of system working is securing the commitment of system partners from 
outside the NHS, such as local government, who are subject to separate institutional contexts 
regarding priorities, ways of working and financial rules.  STPs and ICSs are voluntary 
partnerships (although in effect mandated by NHS policy for NHS organisations), with no 
formal powers or accountabilities, in which decision making is consensual. There have been 
no relevant legislative changes, so the HSCA 2012 provisions concerning the respective roles 
of NHS commissioning organisations and the regulatory framework in respect of competition 
remain in force (Sanderson et al., 2017).  
In order to understand how effective these new forms of collaboration are in achieving their 
goals, it is important to investigate how STPs and ICSs are developing locally, including the 
development of leadership and co-operative arrangements, the way system partners are 
reconciling individual and system roles and the way local priorities are being reconciled with 




1.2 Governance and regulation of ICSs and STPs 
ICSs and STPs are focused on shared decision-making regarding the allocation of resources, 
service design and improving population health (although under existing legislation, any 
procurement or awarding of contracts must be undertaken by NHS commissioners). Guidance 
published by NHS England (NHS, 2019b, p. 3) sets out the functions of ICSs as follows: to 
develop system strategy and planning; to develop system-wide governance and accountability 
arrangements; to lead the implementation of strategic change; to manage performance and 
collective financial resources; and to identify and spread best practices across the system to 
reduce unwarranted variation in care and outcomes.  Underlying these overarching aims are 
more detailed expectations of the outcomes that systems will be instrumental in delivering 
alongside statutory organisations. For example, ICSs and STPs are tasked with driving forward 
five key NHS priorities set out in The Long Term Plan (LTP) (NHS England, 2019) (including 
boosting out of hospital care, reducing pressure on emergency hospital services, developing 
personalised care, implementing digitally enabled care, and focusing on population health and 
local partnerships), and The 20/21 Operational Planning and Contracting Guidance outlines 
clear expectation that systems, alongside statutory organisations, will oversee the delivery of 
operational targets (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020f).  
The policy context regarding the development of STPs and ICSs can be characterised as 
permissive. STPs and ICSs are ‘bottom-up’ partnership arrangements, rather than following a 
single national blueprint and there are currently few governance requirements to which all 
systems must adhere. All systems are organised according to a three tier spatially based model, 
with the implicit expectation that the levels will nest within one another: broadly speaking, the 
‘system’ area covered by the STP or ICS (population size of 1-3 million) contains ‘places’ and 
‘neighbourhoods’ within it, and ‘regional’ and ‘national’ oversight through the regional arms  
and national presence of NHS England and Improvement (NHSEI) (see Figure 1 below). In 
practice STPs and ICSs (and ‘places’ and ‘neighbourhoods’) vary considerably in terms of 
population size and organisational complexity, reflecting local factors such as demography and 
existing networks of collaboration, and may elude neat containment within coherent territorial 
geographies (Hammond et al., 2017). NHS policy guidance sets out ‘places’ (population size 
of 250, 000 – 500,000) as operating typically at borough/local authority level ‘served by a set 
of health and care providers in a town or district, connecting primary care networks to broader 
services including those provided by local councils, community hospitals or voluntary 
organisations’ (NHS, 2019b). Local authorities have a key role in working in ‘places’ through 
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ICS structures whereby ‘commissioners will make shared decisions with providers on 
population health, service redesign and Long Term Plan implementation’ (NHS, 2019a, p. 10). 
 
Important changes are occurring to create ‘neighbourhoods’ (population size of 35,000-50,000) 
through the formation of Primary Care Networks (PCNs). Introduced in the NHS Long Term 
Plan (NHS, 2019a),  but building on an aspiration for greater ‘at scale’ working in primary care 
established in the Five Year Forward View (NHS, 2014), PCNs involve groups of GP practices 
(typically covering patient populations of 30,000-50,000) agreeing to work more closely with 
each other, as well as attempting to integrate better with community  health care services and 
other local health and care organisations. 
Figure 1: Overview of integrated care systems and their priorities from the NHS Long-Term (from (NHS 
England and NHS Improvement, 2019b) 
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The configuration of PCNs is not straightforward: while policy suggests that multiple 
contiguous PCNs make up ‘neighbourhoods’ and nest ‘within places’, in reality PCN 
boundaries are much less clear cut and include significant overlap (Checkland et al., 2020). 
PCN policy and guidance suggests that other community-based services – such as community 
nursing – will realign themselves around neighbourhood footprints. Research into PCNs is 
currently underway, led by other members of the Policy Research Unit in Health and Social 
Care Systems and Commissioning (PRUComm) (Checkland et al., 2020). Therefore, whilst 
links are noted here, their development is analysed in depth elsewhere. 
The document ‘Next Steps on the NHS Five Year Forward View’ (NHS England, 2017) (NHS 
England and NHS Improvement, 2020f) sets out the governance requirements of STPs and ICSs 
(later updated in The Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a, p. 30) and expanded upon in the 20/21 
Operational Planning Guidance (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020f)), namely that 
they should include: system wide governance which includes a partnership board, drawn from 
commissioners, trusts, primary care networks, local authorities, the voluntary and community 
sector and other partners; a clear leadership model including a system leader and a non-
executive chair; sufficient clinical and management capacity drawn from across their 
constituent organisations to enable them to implement agreed system-wide changes; system 
capabilities to fulfil the core role of an ICS and a sustainable model for resourcing these; agree 
ways of working across the system in respect of financial governance and collaboration; and 
capital and estates plans at system level. It is also expected that ICSs should engage fully with 
primary care and PCNs. 
Although there have been no changes to the wider institutional context to date there are 
expectations in The Long Term Plan that local organisations, professionals and national 
regulatory bodies should align to system working where possible. Specifically, it is expected 
that clinical leadership should be aligned around the ICS to ensure clear accountability to the 
ICS, that the CQC’s regulatory approach should emphasise partnership working and system 
wide quality;  NHS providers are required to contribute to ICS goals and performance; and 
ICSs are expected to work with Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) (NHS England, 2019, 
p30).  Most recently, NHSEI has put forward plans for changes to regulation and oversight to 
support system working which include issuing guidance under the NHS provider licence that 
good governance for NHS providers includes a duty to collaborate; and ensuring foundation 
trust directors’ and governors’ duties to the public support system working (NHS England and 




The Care Quality Commission (CQC) which has a remit across health and adult social care 
delivery is, to a degree, focusing on the performance of individual organisations through the 
system lens. The CQC’s powers in regard of system review are somewhat limited as The Health 
and Social Care Act 2008 gives the CQC the power to regulate individual providers, with no 
equivalent set of mechanisms to drive improvement at system level.  However, in July 2017 
the CQC commenced 20 system wide reviews (later extended to 23 reviews) conducted across 
local authority areas, triggered by a ministerial request for targeted reviews of local health and 
social care systems (CQC, 2019), and in July 2020 announced a series of Provider 
Collaboration Reviews, which look at how health and social care providers are working 
together in local areas (Trenholm, 2020). The aim of these Provider Collaboration reviews is 
to help providers learn from each other's experience of responding to COVID-19, by looking 
at provider collaboration across all ICSs and STPs. Reflecting the jurisdiction of the CQC in 
relation to individual organisations only, participation in these latter reviews is not mandatory, 
and findings do not affect ratings. The recent proposals from NHSEI regarding legislative 
reform suggests it is working with the CQC to embed a requirement for strong participation in 
ICS collaborative arrangements in its provider assessment (NHS England and NHS 
Improvement, 2020b). 
While quality regulation through the CQC has a focus across adult health and social care 
delivery, NHSEI is responsible for the performance regulation and support of commissioners 
and providers of NHS services only. Local Authorities are outside this framework, and have 
separate accountabilities for finance and performance,  to communities for how they spend 
their money, and local politicians and officers operate within local governance frameworks of 
checks and balances, overseen by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (National Audit Office, 2019a).  
 
The new regional NHSEI teams led by regional directors are tasked with supporting the 
development and identity formation of the ICSs and STPs(NHS England, 2019). The oversight 
arrangements for regional teams include shifting from a focus on the NHS individual 
organisations to working through systems where possible, specifically: taking a system 
perspective with greater emphasis on system performance, and the contribution of individual 
healthcare providers and commissioners to system goals; working with and through system 
leaders, wherever possible, to tackle problems; matching accountability for results with 
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improvement support as appropriate; allowing greater autonomy to systems with evidenced 
capability for collective working and track record of successful delivery of NHS priorities 
(NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2019d).  
 
The ‘System Maturity Matrix’ outlines the core capabilities expected of emerging ICSs, 
developing ICSs, maturing ICSs and thriving ICSs (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 
2019b). For a system to be formally named an ICS, they will need to broadly meet the attributes 
of a maturing ICS across domains consisting of system leadership, partnerships and change 
capability, system architecture and financial management and planning, integrated care 
models, track record on delivery and coherent and defined population. The matrix uses a 
‘progression model’ rather than a checklist approach, recognising that systems will not develop 
all domains at the same pace and will therefore have varying levels of maturity across each 
domain. As systems progress across the matrix they are given increased freedoms and 
flexibilities according to a principle of earned autonomy, including a greater shared 
responsibility for the overall quality of care and use of resources across their population (NHS 
England and NHS Improvement, 2019d, Annex 1). Assurance functions are expected to 
develop as systems progress through the Matrix. At Level 4, Thriving ICS’s are expected to 
lead the assurance of individual organisations, agree and co-ordinate any Trust or CCG 
intervention carried out by NHSEI.  At this level NHSEI will undertake the least number of 
formal assurance meetings possible with individual organisations, and will operate a light touch 
regarding the assurance of organisational plans. 
NHS providers and commissioners are subject to various financial mechanisms to incentivise 
partnership working. The most significant of these is the System Control Total which provides 
incentives to NHS providers and commissioners. In 2019/20 all STPs/ICSs were required by 
NHSEI to produce a system operating plan for 2019/20 comprising a system overview and 
system data aggregation, containing shared capacity and activity assumptions to provide a 
single, system-wide framework for the organisational activity plans (NHS England and NHS 
Improvement, 2019c). NHSEI also set a System Control Total for each STP/ICS (based on the 
sum of individual organisation control totals). Providers within ICSs were expected to link a 
proportion of their Provider Sustainability Fund (PSF) and any applicable Commissioner 
Sustainability Fund (CSF) (systems of cash rewards in return for meeting financial targets) to 
delivery of their system control total (ibid.). 
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1.3 Research Questions  
System integration is a key goal of NHS policy and will continue to be salient for the next few 
years as the details of the relevant structures and governance arrangements develop.  
Understanding system management and oversight and exploring the role of commissioning and 
incentives in such systems will be important for supporting policy development and practice. 
The aim of this PRUComm study is to investigate the further development of STPs and ICSs 
in order to find out how effective these new forms of collaboration are in achieving their goals, 
and what factors influence this. Building on extensive previous PRUComm research  in this 
area (Allen et al., 2017, Moran et al., 2018, Lorne et al., 2019) the objectives of the study are 
to find out: 
1) How the local leadership and cooperative arrangements with stakeholders (statutory, 
independent and community-based, including local authorities) are governed in the light of 
the ICS governance recommendations in the LTP. How statutory commissioning 
organisations including local authorities are facilitating local strategic decisions and their 
implementation; and whether different types of commissioning function are evolving at 
different system levels.  
2) Whether ICSs are able to allocate resources more efficiently across sectoral boundaries and 
bring their local health economies into financial balance.  
3) How individual organisations are reconciling their role in an ICS with their individual roles, 
accountabilities and statutory responsibilities.  
4) How national regulators are responding to the changes in modes of planning and 
commissioning and actual service configurations, in the light of the changed priorities for 
these regulators set out in the LTP. 
5) Which mechanisms are used to commission services in ICSs. In particular, how is 
competition used to improve quality and/or value for money of services; and are more 
complex forms of contract (such as alliancing) being used? How are local organisations 
reconciling new service configurations with current/evolving pricing structures, and thus 
how are financial incentives being used? 
6) How locality priorities, including those of local authorities, are reconciled with the wider 
priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. In particular, how is co-ordination achieved between 
STP and ICS plans, local priorities and existing programmes of work such as any local new 




This interim report is based on the first phase of fieldwork, which consisted of interviews with 
system members, meeting observation and the analysis of documents. The fieldwork was 
curtailed due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic response on the availability of system 
partners for interviews.  Consequently, we did not complete all our planned interviews with 
system partners. We are intending to complete a further round of fieldwork, including 
interviews with system partners, partners at place level and representatives of regional NHSEI, 




2. Theoretical framework 
The study is underpinned by a number of relevant theories broadly relating to network 
governance which have informed the development of research questions and will inform the 
analysis of the findings for the interim and final reports for the study.  
STPs and ICSs are forms of networks. Definitions of networks vary, but they can be 
characterised as informal modes of co-ordination (Thompson, 2003) between organisations (6 
et al., 2006, Thompson, 2003), or between organisations and individuals (6 et al., 2006). 
Members typically have complementary strengths and share interdependencies, a combination 
which motivates them to make plans together in advance to co-ordinate their activities in light 
of long-term reciprocal relationships. Networks can be conceptualised as a third mode of 
governance, with co-operation mechanisms which differ from the mechanisms of the market 
(price, transactions, exit) and those of the hierarchy (rules, commands, authority). Relational 
norms are valuable enablers of collaboration in networks, where there is a lack of unifying 
external control and sanctions, and where there is a high level of uncertainty about the future 
(Williamson, 1993). Norms such as openness, reciprocity and fairness are acknowledged to 
generate trust and discourage ‘malfeasance’, and can take a ‘smoothing’ role in relations 
between organisations and within organisations, effectively allowing parties to co-ordinate 
their behaviour without vertical integration (Granovetter, 1985). The wider environment in 
which networks are situated is of importance to the establishment and endurance of these 
attributes and is therefore of particular significance to network scholarship and understanding 
the operation of networks in practice. For example, it is thought that trust is produced and 
strengthened by action (Sydow, 1998), and is more likely to exist where there is familiarity 
through repeated interactions, when it is not considered to be in the interest of the other party 
to act opportunistically, and where there are coinciding values and norms (Gambetta, 1988).  
 
A further relevant field of scholarship is economic theories of cooperation, which can inform 
understanding of the circumstances in which organisations and individuals are willing and able 
to cooperate with each other. The significant policy turn in the English NHS emphasises the 
collective nature of the delivery of health services calling on local commissioners and providers 
to put self-interest aside and work collectively make best use of the available collective 
resources (National Audit Office, 2019b, NHS England, 2017). However, this is somewhat at 
odds with the residual institutional context of the English NHS (as explained in Section 1) 
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which is predominantly state led, with some elements of market institutions. Economic theory 
refers to the paradox of achieving co-operation between self-interested parties through the 
concept of ‘social dilemmas’. Social dilemmas arise when a group has shared usage of a 
common output, and each individual in the group can decide their own strategy regarding the 
use of the resource.  Such collective action problems are characterised by a conflict between 
the immediate self-interest of the individual and longer term collective interests. A well-known 
social dilemma, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), suggests collective action 
problems must always lead to overgrazing and resource degradation. 
 
The work of Elinor Ostrom (1990, 1994) disputes that collective action problems regarding 
usage of common pools must always lead to overgrazing and resource degradation, and 
contends that communities can agree rules governing the ‘appropriation’ (withdrawal) of such 
limited common pool resources in a way that benefits all community members and leads to the 
sustainability of the resource.  The resonance of the notion of the ‘health commons’ with the 
development of place based systems of care within the NHS to address issues of organisational 
fragmentation and scarcity of resources has been acknowledged (Ham and Alderwick, 2015, 
Sanderson et al., 2020), and this research will consider her framework in relation to the ongoing 
development of STPs and ICSs.  Through multiple case studies of long-enduring, self-governed 
common pool resources, Ostrom developed principles which describe the environment in 
which ‘appropriators’ (those who withdraw resources) are willing to devise and commit to 
shared operational rules and to monitor each other's conformance (Ostrom, 1990). These 
principles address the need for ‘communities’ (those with a shared dependence on the common 
pool) to set up clear boundaries and membership around the common pool, agree for 
themselves rules regarding appropriation and provision of resources, and agree the process for 
monitoring of behaviour and sanctions. Rules can help or hinder levels of co-operation, the 
development of trustworthiness and the achievement of ‘effective, equitable and sustainable 
outcomes’ (Ostrom, 2010).  This research will draw on these principles in order to understand 
the ways in which ICSs/STPs and the wider institutional context in which they are situated may 
support the development of successful self-governance of common resources.  
 
Alongside economic theories regarding co-operation, the report draws on relevant theories 
regarding governance. These theories are important as they relate to the development of STPs’ 
and ICSs’ capacity to make decisions about the allocation of resources, and the type of 
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accountabilities which are developing between system partners, and between the system and 
regulators. 
Bossert’s (1998) theorisation of ‘decision space’ proposes an analytical framework to describe 
the decentralisation of health systems in terms of the set of functions and degrees of ‘choice’ 
(discretion) that are transferred to local officials from central authorities. It has been used to 
explore the extent to which local autonomy is available in areas of relevance to health and 
social care systems, such as finances, service organisation, human resources and rules of 
governance. ‘Decision space’ refers to how much autonomy decentralised bodies have to 
develop policy, allocate resources, and define programs and services. Decentralised bodies act 
within decision space which is defined both formally, by laws and regulations, and informally 
by  the enactment of the rules in practice. Decision space is therefore iterative, and subject to 
negotiation, challenge and friction. Whether decentralized institutions obtain the decision space 
allotted to them in formal frameworks depends on norms as well as the broader institutional 
context. Decision space is an important analytic concept which can be applied to the developing 
relationships and division of functions between STPs/ICSs and other actors, such as regulators, 
and between systems and places, in order to understand the decentralisation of functions that 
is occurring and the degree of discretion in place. 
 
Accountability is a central concept to be considered when examining the potential of these new 
forms of collaboration to achieve their goals. The development of accountabilities within 
systems is central to the development of co-operation between system partners (Moran et al., 
2018). The development of accountabilities affecting the function of STPs and ICSs will be 
considered in the light of Bovens’ conceptualisation of accountability. Accountability can be 
described as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, 
and the actor may face consequences’ (Bovens, 2007). This definition can be interrogated to 
identify different types of accountability based on the nature of the actor, forum, conduct and 
obligation. Vertical accountability refers to a hierarchical relationship between the actor and 
the forum, which allows the latter to formally wield power over the former. In contrast, with 
horizontal accountability, a hierarchical relationship and formal accountability obligations are 
absent, and the concern is with accountability between stakeholders in a network (Bovens, 




An aim of this research is to investigate the development of leadership and co-operative 
arrangements in the light of STP and ICSs’ status as horizontal cooperative working 
arrangements without legal sanction. A further key question to be addressed by the research is 
how system partners balance system accountabilities with their own pre-existing 
accountabilities as sovereign organisations, for example vertical accountabilities to regulators 
such as the CQC and NHSEI.  There is a number of potential accountability relationships in 
systems. These can be categorised as firstly vertical (and formal): holding to account of the 
system, system leaders and (NHS) system partners for system performance by NHSEI, but 
secondly also informal and horizontal within systems: the holding to account of system partners 
by the system. STP and ICSs also have an informal accountability relationship with the public 
which should be considered alongside system partners’ own accountabilities to the public. NHS 
bodies have public accountabilities, which have been characterised as a relatively weak notion 
of transparency with no associated sanctions (Peckham, 2014).  Local Authorities however 
have direct local accountability to their electorate who vote for council members in 
local elections (alongside other complex accountability relationships) (National Audit Office, 
2019a). 
 
Using the definitions of Bovens regarding accountability to better understand system partners’ 
experience and understandings of accountability relationships forms an important element of 




3. Empirical studies of STPs and ICSs  
 
This section reviews the existing evidence relating to STPs and ICSs relevant to the perspective 
taken by this research, namely how these new forms of collaboration are developing to address 
their goals, including the development of leadership and co-operative arrangements, the way 
system partners are reconciling individual and system roles and the way local priorities are 
being reconciled with system priorities.  
Collaboration has always been an important behaviour in the English NHS, as illustrated by 
many empirical studies which describe the persistence of collaborative behaviour amongst 
commissioners and providers of NHS services since the establishment of the internal market 
(e.g. Bennett and Ferlie, 1996, Flynn et al., 1996, Allen, 2002, Ferlie et al., 2010, Ferlie et al., 
2011, Frosini et al., 2012, Porter et al., 2013). The interplay of competition and co-operation 
was the subject of PRUComm research which investigated the way in which local health 
systems were managed to ensure that cooperative behaviour was appropriately coexisting with 
competition in the period following the HSCA 2012. This research found that commissioners 
and providers used a judicious mixture of competition and cooperation in their dealings with 
each other, and that CCGs played an important role in co-ordination at a local level (Allen et 
al., 2015).  
 
More recently, a small number of empirical studies have been published which are concerned 
with the development of STPs and ICSs. These studies focus on the challenges and 
opportunities of system working (Timmins, 2019), the development of systems in different 
parts of the UK, including in the light of the move to ICS status (Charles et al., 2018, NHS 
Providers and NHS Clinical Commissioners, 2018, Pett, 2020a), the funding and resourcing of 
‘engine room’ staff (Pett, 2019), and the role of CCGs in the current commissioning landscape, 
including STPs. Additionally, the NHS Confederation has published reports which reflect the 
views of senior leaders from NHS and local government on various aspects of the development 
of systems (NHS Confederation, 2020, Das-Thompson et al., 2020, Pett, 2020b). The work of 
Walshe et al concerning the ‘devolved control’ of the budget for health and social care for the 
population of Greater Manchester is also highly relevant to the development of system working 




The research suggests that, in order to be effective in achieving their aims, STPs and ICSs need 
to undertake substantial ground work to establish robust governance arrangements, clear lines 
of accountability and to build relationships, and furthermore that such ground work may be the 
overriding concern in the early stages of collaborative working, preceding any collaborative 
decision making to achieve system aims. Indeed, Charles et al (2018) found, in a study based 
on interviews across 8 ICSs, that much of the work of those systems had focused on such 
preliminary activities. This is supported by the research relating to the devolution of the health 
and social care budget in Greater Manchester (Walshe et al., 2018) where it was reported that, 
in the first two years of the arrangement, effort had been expended on the establishment of 
governance arrangements, relationship and agreeing strategies, with only a recent shift in focus 
to implementation. It is not always the case that system working will develop strong 
relationships. A recent management consultancy review of one of the first wave ICSs 
discovered poor relationships and a lack of trust between partners (Health Service Journal, 
2021). However, research also suggests that these forms of collaboration do have the capacity 
to effect change, finding that collaboration within ICSs and STPs is resulting in tangible 
improvement in relationships (Timmins, 2019) and collaborative working is taking place to 
manage finances and performance across the system in ways that did not occur previously 
(Charles et al., 2018). 
 
An area of commonality across much of the research which has been conducted to date is the 
significance of local context as a factor which impacts the evolution of system working 
(Charles et al., 2018, Moran et al., 2018), such as the relative levels of influence between trusts, 
CCGs and local government (Pett, 2020a), and the degree of fit between shared understandings 
of ‘places’ and system boundaries (Charles et al., 2018).  It is suggested, for example that where 
there are strong local relationships these will benefit most from the permissive policy context 
(NHS Providers and NHS Clinical Commissioners, 2018). One recommendation arising is to 
support local ways of working, and allow local relationships to develop (NHS Confederation, 
2020). 
 
Alongside findings related to the establishment of necessary governance arrangements, are 
findings relating to the lack of clarity in system governance and accountabilities, and 
difficulties arising from the lack of formal status of systems. Studies suggest that  system 
leaders may have variations in perceptions of accountabilities, that governance is subject to 
ongoing flux (Timmins, 2019), that systems may be treated as accountable by NHSEI (Moran 
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et al., 2018) and that there may be a lack of understanding over the existence of functions at 
regional, place and neighbourhood level (Pett, 2019). In relation to the development of 
partnership arrangements in Manchester, it was found that the formal status of partnership 
governance forums was perceived to be ambiguous, and that the partnership had few formal 
levers to use over NHS organisations, and even fewer in relation to local authorities, with 
individual organisations continuing to guard their autonomy carefully and act to serve 
organisational self-interest (Walshe et al., 2018). Additionally, it has been noted that there is a 
continuing tension between the statutory framework and the emphasis on systems and 
partnership working (Charles et al., 2018, Moran et al., 2018). The most recent research on the 
operation of systems in the COVID-19 and post COVID-19 world suggests that there is an 
increasing appetite for the strengthening of system working, and the formalisation of working 





4. Study Design and Methods 
 
The study consists of three in-depth case studies to investigate the development of STPs and 
ICSs. Each case study consists of a system and its partners. 
The research questions and the research instruments were derived from relevant scholarship 
including economic theories of co-operation and the relevant NHS policy context, and address 
the aspects of these partnership models of decision making which are likely to relate to 
important issues concerning the operation and impact of these arrangements.  
4.1 Selection of the case study sites 
The use of case studies was thought to be the most appropriate research design for this study 
as interviews and documentary analysis were informed by the contextual information we were 
able to gather by concentrating on three specific systems. An initial literature review of NHS 
systems governance (Lorne et al., 2019) examined research into previous intermediate tiers in 
the NHS and this was also drawn on to inform strategy when selecting case study sites.  The 
literature review highlighted the importance of boundaries in relation to system working, in 
particular suggesting that coterminosity of boundaries may help co-ordination between health 
and social care, but would not necessarily lead to ‘integrated care’ for patients. Additionally, 
the report highlighted uncertainty regarding the degree to which voluntary and private sector 
organisations were embedded in systems. Consequently, we identified local authority 
configuration, system boundaries, private sector and/or social enterprise partners and 
concentration of providers as characteristics of interest to the study, and we sought to recruit 
case study sites which demonstrated variance across these characteristics. Additionally, as we 
were also interested in the role of the regional NHSI function, we sought to identify case study 
sites from a variety of NHSEI regions.   We identified possible case study sites after reviewing 
our own database of all STPs and ICSs in England, which contained information drawn from 
publicly available sources. We shortlisted a number of possible sites after considering the STPs 
and ICSs in relation to the characteristics of interest and then gathered more information about 
these sites from publicly available information (most commonly Board papers). 
An overview of the systems which were selected can be found in Section 5. The three case 
study sites (one ICS and two STPs) are located in different parts of England. Case Study 1 
covers an urban population, has complicated boundaries and includes 5 unitary authorities. 
Case Study 2 system shares near coterminosity with the county council, and system partners 
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include social enterprises. Case Study 3 system has a large geographical footprint, and a 
complex, multi-layered governance structure spanning seven CCGs and eight Local 
Authorities. 
4.2 Securing access to case study sites 
Potential research sites were initially approached by email to the leader of the STP or ICS. If 
this approach was successful we then liaised with this person or a nominated representative 
about the best way to secure system permission to conduct the research. In two case studies 
this involved attending a system governance forum to gain permission of all partners, and in 
one case it involved a detailed discussion with representatives of system leaders, who then 
presented the case to system partners. Once permission was granted we then liaised with the 
main contact to establish the key contacts in each member organisation or body. Each contact 
was approached separately to request their participation in the research. The interviewees 
consisted of Director level staff and/or senior managers who were responsible for representing 
their organisation in the system. 
4.3 Ethical approval 
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine internal ethics committee on 23 August 2019 (Ref:17711). NHS research governance 
approval from the HRA was granted on the 6th August 2019 (266175/REC ref 19/HRA/3261). 
We participated in a streamlined NHS research governance approval process piloted by the 
Health Research Authority (HRA). Due to the low burden nature of this study and the seniority 
of the research participants, we were not expected to separately notify this project to the 
Research and Development office of each NHS organisation from which we sought 
participation. The seniority of the research participants meant that the research participants 
were themselves the most appropriate parties to confirm whether they were willing to 
participate. We also received endorsement from the Association of Director of Adult Social 
Services Executive Council for the research on 19 November 2019.  
 
4.4 Summary of methods 
 
This interim report is based on findings from the first phase of fieldwork which was undertaken 
between December 2019 and March 2020. Fieldwork was halted prematurely in March 2020 





During Phase 1 of the fieldwork we interviewed 28 people across the three case study sites (see 
Table 1). MS, DO, CL and OB conducted the interviews. The interviews explored 
interviewees’ experience of decision making in systems, the reconciliation of individual roles, 
accountabilities and statutory responsibilities with system roles, the impact of financial 
mechanisms on system working, reconciliation of local and system priorities, co-ordination 
between place and system, and system impact on resource allocation across sectoral boundaries 
and the achievement of financial balance.  
Findings from three interviews (with four interviewees) from the start of Phase 2 of the 
fieldwork (see Table 2) have also been included in this interim report as they contained 
information about the system role in relation to the COVID 19 response. Fieldwork in respect 
of Phase 2 continues and will be written up in our final report. 
Table 1: Phase 1 interviewees by case study site and organisational type 
 Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 Total 
interviews  No of 
partners         
Interviews No of 
partners 





-- 2 -- 4 --- 2 8 
CCG 4  0  4 1 (lead of  all 
CCGS) 
7 1 2 
NHS 
Providers 
5  3  6 (inc Amb 
Trust) 
3 5 4 10 
Local 
Authorities 
5 1  1 1 8 4 6 
Primary 
Care  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 
Providers 
0 0 2 2 0 0 2 
Total 
interviews 
-- 6 -- 11 -- 11 28 
 
Table 2: Early Phase 2 interviewees by case study site and organisational type 
 Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 Total 
STP leadership 0 1 1 2 
CCG 0 0 2 2 
Total 0 1 3 4 
 
Use of documentation  
We gathered documentation, from all three case study sites. This included strategic plans, 
meeting papers and details of governance structures. These sources were used to add detail to 




We observed eight meetings during the first phase of the research (three in Case Study 1, three 
in Case Study 2 and two in Case Study 3). All meetings were system level meetings, of the 
Partnership Board or significant system forums. The purpose of observing a variety of meetings 
was to supplement the information we obtained from interviews with the parties. Notes were 
taken during each of these meetings, and were subsequently used to confirm our understandings 
of the governance processes in place. 
Analysis of data 
PA, MS, DO and CL agreed the theoretical framework, and the main themes derived from the 
research questions. MS and DO agreed additional themes emerging from the data. These 
themes were used to analyse the data, and structure the report. MS, DO, CL and OB conducted 
the thematic analysis. The findings are presented in a way as to highlight similarities between 





5. Overview of case studies  
The section gives an overview of each case study area in terms of the size of the system, some 
information about the area and population it covers, an overview of system partners, and their 
configuration. Table 3 summarises the characteristics of each case study site, as they are 
described in the narrative. Figure 2 (overleaf) depicts the spatial organisation of each case study 
system and its constituent partners. 
 Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 
Population 1.5 million 1 million 1.9 million 
CCGs 4 4 7 
NHS providers* 5 6 5 
Other healthcare 
providers* 
0 2 0 
Single tier local 
government* 
5 Unitary Authorities 0 8 Local Authorities 
Upper tier of local 
government* 
0 1 County Council 0 
Lower tier of local 
government* 
0 10+ Borough Councils 0 
No of ‘places’ within 
system* 
5 5 (one non spatial) 3 sub systems 
* a fuller description of these categories is given below in the narrative descriptions of each case study system 
 
Case Study 1  
Case Study 1 is an STP covering a population of approximately 1.5 million people. At the time 
of the fieldwork it consisted of four constitutive CCGs and five NHS providers (see Table 2 
above). The STP area includes five unitary authorities. Due to complicated boundaries, 
changing leadership and the evolving vision for the STP, membership of the STP was 
characterised by certain fluidity with some providers being added as partners of STP during 
the fieldwork. 
The STP has formed into five places which correspond with the five unitary authorities. Each 
place has a distinct and strong local identity, with different local priorities, governance and 
service delivery models.  
Table 3: Characteristics of case study sites ( as at December 2019) 
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There are multiple complications around boundaries and membership. CCG and local authority 
boundaries are largely coterminous, with the exception of one CCG which stretches into two 
LA areas. However the five authorities are part of a Combined Authority with strategic powers, 
including over transport, and economic development, which is larger than the STP area. At the 
time of the fieldwork there appeared to be a tension between the desire to retain local identity 
and distinction at place/local authority level and a move to create more uniformity across the 
system.  At the time of the fieldwork GPs were opposing the plans to merge the CCGs by April 
2021 into one CCG coterminous with the STP.  
Case Study 2 
The Case Study 2 system has ICS status (Stage 3 ‘thriving’ ICS). The ICS serves a population 
of around one million people. Formal system membership at the time of the fieldwork included 
four CCGs, five NHS provider organisations, two social enterprises, an NHS Ambulance Trust, 
general practice (represented as a single provider), and the County Council.  
Additionally, a devolution agreement is in place locally between the CCGs, the County 
Council, NHS England and NHS Improvement focusing on the development of local control 
of health and care commissioning decisions and increasing alignment between NHS and local 
government commissioning responsibilities. 
In terms of its boundaries and coterminosity, the system is in many ways straightforward.  At 
the time of fieldwork, there was near coterminosity between the ICS and Council, with the ICS 
encompassing the vast majority of the Council population, and this was reflected in strong 
Council leadership of the system. A merger to form a single CCG covering the ICS was 
anticipated to take place in April 2020. However, within the system issues of boundaries and 
coterminosity were more complex. The lower tier of local government consisted of more than 
ten Districts and Boroughs, which largely did not share boundaries with the CCGs. One of the 
providers is a member of two systems, which are in two different NHS England regions.   
The ICS has formed four spatially configured places (a fifth non- spatial place has a remit 
concerning services that need to be planned, prioritised and delivered at scale, such as 
children’s and family services, learning disability and autism, mental health and continuing 
health care). The four geographically configured places are based around the population flows 
into an acute hospital, reflect former CCG boundaries, and are largely not coterminous with 
District or Borough Council boundaries. 
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Case Study 3 
Case Study 3 is an STP in a large urban area. It has a large geographical footprint, and covers 
a population of 1.9 million, making it the largest of the case studies. The STP is projecting a 
considerable population growth over the next ten years. The system has a complex, multi-
layered governance structure spanning seven CCGs and eight Local Authorities.  
At the time of fieldwork, the system was particularly notable for the formation of a two-tier 
place level.  The STP was organised on the basis of three places each corresponding with a 
main acute provider footprint and anchored in the historical host commissioner arrangements. 
These places were referred to as ‘systems’ or ‘partnerships’ in the STP documents, however, 
in order to avoid confusion with the STP system level in this report we refer to them as 
‘subsystems’. The three subsystems were of unequal size in terms of population and 
geographical area and were at different stages of partnership development.  Each 
subsystem/place was in turn divided into borough-based partnerships corresponding with local 
authority boundaries. Thus, this case study had an additional layer of network cooperation 
nested between the STP and the borough place level envisaged by policy – i.e. the larger 
places/subsystems. 
The STP has not decided how to involve GP Federations and PCNs in system governance, but 
GP Federations are (and PCNs may be) involved at sub-system/place level. 
Notwithstanding internal complexity, the Case Study 3 STP has relatively straightforward 
external boundaries. The three acute providers are mostly internally facing, although some 
serve as major tertiary care centres and receive some patients from neighbouring STPs. In 
contrast, the two community and mental health providers have to engage more closely with the 









Figure 2: Representation of the spatial organisation of case study systems and partners 









Case Study 2 




6. The configuration of systems and system membership 
This section discusses interviewees’ views regarding the configuration of systems and system 
membership, and the implications of this for the achievement of co-ordination within systems.   
We found system partners’ capacity to co-operate was subject to structural tensions reflecting 
the differences in accountability and focus between NHS and local government. Additionally, 
the degree of fit between system partners’ delineations, such as flows of a provider’s patients or 
local authority boundaries, and STP or ICS footprints had the capacity to differ greatly. In this 
respect local context led to complexity of governance arrangements where organisational 
functions did not align with the spatial configurations at system and place level, and weakened 
incentives for collaboration where organisations were spread across more than one system. In 
terms of NHS partners, it appeared that a shift from competition to a collaborative ethos was 
underway, but this was acknowledged to be a long-term undertaking. 
6.1 Membership of systems  
Policy expectation as laid out in the Long Term Plan (NHS England, 2019)  is that the core 
membership of systems should include ‘commissioners, trusts, primary care networks, and – 
with the clear expectation that they will wish to participate – local authorities, the voluntary 
and community sector and other partners’ (ibid.). In the case studies, membership at system 
level was largely confined to ‘core’ providers drawn from the NHS and local government, with 
other partners such as voluntary sector organisations, independent sector providers, and wider 
agencies such as police and education engaged at place or neighbourhood level, in particular 
system forums or through specific engagement activities. System membership was experienced 
differently by organisations inside and outside the NHS, reflecting differences in institutional 
contexts and the NHS-led nature of ICS and STPs.  
Although the relationships between system partners in all case studies were said to be 
developing constructively, interviewees identified a number of structural tensions which could 
negatively impact system working, and which systems were engaged with mitigating.  The 
inherent differences between the governance of local government and of the NHS complicated 
collaboration within systems, highlighting tensions aligning national health with local 
government which have been in existence since the NHS was created (Lorne et al., 2019). 
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Structural tensions exist around different institutional frameworks and ways of working 
between NHS and local government, across areas of difference such as degree of local 
independence, accountability of local government to local politicians and the public, differing 
financial rules and regulations, the use in local government of competitive tendering to procure 
services and a reliance on private sector providers. The locally derived, political mandate of 
Local Authorities (LAs) led to a focus on immediate, locally circumscribed strategic interests 
and less uniformity in their actions than NHS organisations: 
All local authorities probably work in a slightly different way.  We all have different 
agendas, we all have different political ambitions, we all have different priorities.  
From the health system point of view, because it’s very much a top down driven 
organisation, you know, there is one way of doing things (Local Authority Director 4, 
Case Study 3, March 2020) 
Given the NHS genesis of the STP and ICS agenda, some LA interviewees felt it could be 
perceived that system working had been imposed on them. System development was viewed 
as both an opportunity and with a dose of scepticism by the LAs.  The emphasis on achieving 
financial balance in the NHS, for instance, was seen by some as an NHS-centric focus. LAs 
were keen to be involved in arrangements as an equal partner, and not the “last thing that you 
come to” (Local Authority Director 4, Case Study 3, March 2020) in a health focused system. 
In some significant aspects membership and participation was different for local government 
than from NHS partners, for example LA partners were not included in the system control 
totals. 
The nature of LA participation differed across the case studies, illustrating the importance of 
local context in driving partnership between NHS and local government in ICSs/STPs. In Case 
Study 2 significant benefit was derived from the near coterminosity between the system and 
the County Council, with joint system leadership and use made of Council structures such as 
the Health and Wellbeing Board (HWB) in system governance structures (see section 8 below). 
However, such arrangements are necessarily difficult to establish where local government 
arrangements do not coincide with system footprints, such as in Case Study 1 (where the system 
contained five unitary authorities) and Case Study 3 (which contained eight unitary authorities), 
where system leadership is brokered across multiple principal councils. In these instances, 
place was suggested as the important forum for meaningful LA and NHS co-ordination.  
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Although it was less common for organisations outside NHS and local government to be 
partners of systems, this did occur. In Case Study 2, social enterprises were considered ‘full’ 
partners of the ICS, however they did not contribute to the control total, and were also subject 
to different financial rules, for instance around spending and the implications of financial 
deficit. 
Systems are expected to engage with wider bodies from the voluntary and community sector 
(NHS England, 2019). Such bodies had not been designated formal system partners of the case 
study systems, but were reported to be engaged at both system and place level, for example in 
specific working groups or through engagement events.  
6.2 System boundaries 
NHSEI guidance suggests that system boundaries should be meaningful in the local context 
particularly regarding patient flows, where possible should be contiguous with LA boundaries 
and should cover a sufficient scale (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2019b), and that 
place should typically operate at borough/council level ‘served by a set of health and care 
providers in a town or district’(ibid). In practice, NHS commissioners, Trusts, and LAs operate 
across different geographies, and examples of complexity where organisational functions did 
not align with the spatial configurations at system and place level were common in the three 
case studies. In the case of local government in particular, it appeared that it was often the case 
that spatial configurations recommended for systems and places did not align with existing 
configurations and ways of working. In two of our case studies (Case Studies 1 and 3), the 
system was not a natural footprint for multiple LAs keen to preserve distinct local identities 
and democratic mandates. In Case Study 2, where there was near coterminosity with the County 
Council at system level, borough and district councils were not always coterminous with place 
footprints (see Figure 2).   
Beyond local government, it was also not unusual for NHS organisations to encounter 
complexities of organisational boundaries or interests. This occurred for instance when the 
partner operated on a pan-system scale (e.g. Ambulance Trusts), or spanned system boundaries 
(e.g. a Trust with multiple sites). In a few instances, NHS provider partners had a stake in the 
neighbouring systems due to considerable patient flows from those areas, or even, in one 
instance, was a partner in more than one system.  
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These difficulties were largely met with pragmatism by system partners, acknowledged as 
inherent in the challenge of imposing spatial footprints on complex configurations of 
organisations across health and social care, including some which did not operate on population 
basis. Despite accepting the complexity of boundaries and spatial scales as inevitable, in some 
instances this lack of alignment had the potential to inhibit collaboration. The impact of non-
coterminosity with system boundaries experienced in systems included duplication of effort, 
complexity of financial arrangements, reduced access to performance information, weakened 
incentives for co-operation and engagement, and communication difficulties.  
Systems sought to mitigate such challenges where they could be addressed, for instance by 
putting in place bespoke governance arrangements. In some cases, the remedy was more 
fundamental. In Case Study 3, where local government configurations were perceived to be a 
particularly awkward fit at the system level due to the sheer volume of organisations involved, 
and where it was recognised that deciding on an appropriate footprint for the STP had not been 
obvious or straightforward, the local actors had deviated from the system/place division in 
favour of a two tier structure at place level, described by one interviewee as “systems within 
systems within systems” (Local Authority Director 1, Case Study 3, January 2020).  This 
arrangement was thought to reflect more accurately local configurations and arrangements, 
particularly those of local government. However, it was also acknowledged these 
arrangements, due in part to the lack of uniformity, remained complex and risked confusion 
and lack of clarity in governance arrangements. 
6.3 System identity 
An important aspect of systems, particularly given their lack of formal status, is the formation 
of a strong identity, ethos, vision and objectives (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 
2019b).  The strength of system identity varied across our case studies. 
In Case Study 2 (the ICS), system identity and its associated concepts seemed most clearly 
established with system partners. This is not surprising given the expectations of system 
progression to ICS status in this regard. It was not clear whether the strong identity led to the 
ICS status, or whether it was the ICS status itself which conferred a strong identity. Certainly, 
the ICS status was perceived by the ICS partners to bring greater opportunities for  “freedom 
and liberation” (ICS Director 1, Case Study 2, January 2020), a responsibility for innovation 
and trail blazing,  and a clear mindset that partners will work together to solve problems. For 
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example, as will be described in Section 7, the ICS was exploring novel opportunities to 
capitalise on the close collaborative relationship between NHS and local government. 
However, as will be explored in Section 12, the nature of the increased ‘freedom and liberation’ 
of the ICS was less clear during this first stage of the fieldwork.  
In contrast in the STP case studies, system identity was under development. In Case Study 1, 
the STP is seen by one interviewee as a mix of independently functioning individual 
organisations focussing on their own performances, and there was also a view that apart from 
board meetings that coordinate the STP activities, not much delineates the system. In Case 
Study 3, despite growing awareness amongst LA partners of what the STP does, and that it 
increasingly plays an important role in decision-making and strategic planning, some LA 
interviewees still struggled with defining what the STP is: 
‘It’s still quite difficult to describe what the STP is, partly as it already has about four 
different names … is it a commissioning body, is it a strategic body, does it exist? I 
mean, you know, glibly someone said to me, well, the STP only exists on a presentation 
slide, you know…. ….. so I think it’s still forming.’ (Local Authority Director 1, Case 
Study 3, January 2020) 
Uniting behind a system vision was acknowledged as a long term task, particularly so in the 
case of system level collaboration, which was at a scale where relationships may not have a 
prior existence. Conversely, there were notably strong relationships at place level where strong 
local place level identities were aided by factors such as coterminosity between acute trusts 
and LA at place level , and pre-existing alliances between providers. Place was more commonly 
seen as the level at which relationships and a common outlook were more likely to pre-exist: 
‘You can have as much governance and as much legislation as you like but unless you 
build relationships you won’t improve things. The only way you’ll build relationships 
is by people having a common core vision, uniting behind that and having enough time 
to spend together. So at the moment they haven’t spent enough time together to develop 
the relationships, it’s still quite early days, I think. They’ve spent more time in their 





6.4 Attitudes towards collaboration 
It appeared a shift from a competitive to a collaborative ethos was underway and making steady 
progress, but this was acknowledged to be a long-term undertaking. Competitive culture and 
behaviour in the NHS were perceived to be deeply ingrained, with one interviewee likening a 
move to system thinking “like turning an oil tanker” (STP Director 2, Case Study 1, December 
2019).  
System leaders were generally enthusiastic about the value of and opportunities for increased 
collaboration, with a widespread recognition that collaboration was the best way to achieve 
better use of resources and health improvement across health and social care, and the only way 
to address the joint challenges shared across health and social care. Relationships between 
leaders within the systems were reported to be improving, and previous relationships which 
had been fractured by competition were becoming collaborative. For example, it was reported 
that CEOs of providers communicated regularly with each other and had begun to take up some 
opportunities to share and collaborate. 
On the other hand, system partners were less certain about the embededdness of this system 
ethos. There was some mistrust of the intentions of others, particularly whether NHS Trusts 
and Foundation Trusts fully intended to abandon the behaviours associated with competitive 
attitudes. Contextual factors were acknowledged to hinder rather than assist the development 
of collaboration within systems. Firstly, it was acknowledged that meaningful collaboration 
depended on the growth of trusting inter-organisational relationships which necessarily 
develop over time. Secondly, it was not certain that the system ethos had permeated beyond 
leadership to those within member organisations, reflecting the entrenched attitudes and 
behaviours of managers who had spent their careers navigating the NHS purchaser/provider 
split, and the concentration of involvement of the most senior leaders of organisations (‘you’ve 
got to retrain a whole, massive layer of NHS management to work collaboratively. And that is 
really, really hard’ (Acute Trust 1, CEO, Case Study 2, December 2019)).  Thirdly, the residual 
formal rules relating to competition in the NHS, the accompanying financial incentives and the 
lack of statutory footing for collaboration within system footprints still incentivised 
competitive behaviour: 
‘Until we change the constitution and the targets and the way the money flows and 
actually the legality behind the construct of a foundation trust, and the construct of an 
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ICS, it’s going to be a more and more difficult conversation to have.’ (Acute Trust 1, 
CEO, Case Study 2, December 2019) 
‘So they’re going to get plaudits if their hospital gets outstanding or good with the 
CQC, they’re going to get plaudits if they deliver their targets. They’re not going to get 
any particular plaudits for working together.’ (STP Director 2, Case Study 1, December 
2019) 
Consequently, the attitudes of providers to the residual opportunities for competition appeared 
to vary across systems. There was both a perception that NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts in 
particular were incentivised to remain inward looking, concerned with their own performance 
and behaviour, with some providers reported to still be embracing opportunities to compete. 
However, some NHS providers interviewed were keen to see the full dismantling of the 
architecture of competition. It was not clear at the time of the fieldwork how these attitudes to 
system working were translating into behaviour in practice. A view was expressed in both Case 
Studies 1 and 2 that, in practice, until the architecture was dismantled, there were limits to the 




7. System action to achieve financial sustainability 
 
Interviewees were hopeful that system working offered an opportunity to achieve a fairer and 
more effective allocation of resources. There was not a high degree of confidence at the time 
of the research (before the COVID -9 pandemic) that current NHS financial targets for systems 
were attainable, or that their attainment was supported by the wider regulatory context. 
Alternative approaches to payments such as blended payments1 were being introduced in some 
places, and were perceived to aid collaboration. Systems were making use of opportunities to 
agree the allocation of central resources between partners, and to develop shared resources. At 
the time of the fieldwork, action to achieve long term financial sustainability in the case studies 
had not been agreed or implemented. This was related to the need to build constructive 
relationships and clear working arrangements between system partners, and was also related to 
wider factors such as an unsupportive wider regulatory and legislative context, a perceived lack 
of power for system leaders to drive through unpopular decisions, and little scope for local 
flexibility due to the number of NHS national mandatory actions.  
7.1 System control totals 
System and individual control totals were viewed as unrealistic by system partners, and the 
notion that systems were able to achieve financial balance was disputed. More detailed 
objections were that individual control total allocations did not consider local circumstances 
and imposed stringent efficiency targets on already struggling and historically underfunded 
providers.  Agreeing projections of performance against control totals was described as a 
process of negotiation with NHSEI.  
In spite of the incentives for a system approach to financial performance contained in the 
system control totals, NHS partners’ view was that the current policy and regulatory regime 
did not support the adoption a system-wide view at the expense of the financial well-being of 
their individual organisation. Some providers were being asked to take on additional cost 
improvement programmes to compensate for large deficits elsewhere in the system, and this 
was felt to be untenable in light of the contradictions in the policy and regulatory context, and 
the non-statutory nature of systems: 
                                                          
1 A holistic blended payment model comprising a fixed element with a quality/outcomes based element, a risk 
sharing element and/or a variable payment to encourage providers and commissioners to adopt cost effective, 
joined up approaches (NHS ENGLAND AND NHS IMPROVEMENT 2019a. 2020/21 National Tariff Payment 
System - a consultation notice. London: NHS England and NHS Improvement.) 
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At the end of the day you’ve got organisations with governing bodies and boards, which 
are tasked with making sure that they’re in financial balance, so they’re hardly going 
to say, oh yes give all my money for [Trust x] – it just isn’t going to happen, is it? (STP 
Director 2, Case Study 1, December 2019) 
Avoiding the imposition of financial penalties for missing the control total required a lot of 
skilful negotiation, clever accounting (‘herding of the finance cats’ (STP Director 1, Case Study 
3, February 2020)) and discussions. Rather than identifying, agreeing and implementing a raft 
of savings to be made, use was made of system-wide accounting and use of non-recurrent 
savings. Examples of measures to achieve system control targets included: asking well 
performing providers to subsidise those in financial difficulty; focusing on the resolution of 
‘income anomalies’; and the use of land sales. It was also noted that policy at the time (the 
Provider Sustainability Fund)2 created incentives for providers to remain in financial balance 
at all costs, rather than commissioners, ‘it’s advantageous for commissioners to hold the deficit 
rather than providers…so we work together to manipulate the system frankly’ (ICS Director 2, 
Case Study 2, March 2020).  
As yet, systems had not reached agreement regarding the detailed actions necessary to achieve 
long term financial sustainability. In part this was because time had been spent building the 
necessary relationships to weather difficult decisions.  There was agreement of the broad 
strategic direction (for example to spend more in primary/community services, increase digital 
interventions, reduce duplication of functions across organisations, and limit ineffective 
procedures), but this had not yet translated into specific agreements in practice about the nature 
of the action to be taken. In Case Study 2 forthcoming work was commencing to both analyse 
what functions can be shared across acute hospitals, and reduce the number of face to face 
outpatient appointments, but this was expected to be a ‘really difficult and painful’ process 
(ICS Director 3, Case Study 2, January 2020). 
7.2 Use of financial mechanisms to aid collaboration 
The national tariff3 was perceived to be incompatible with collaboration and integrated 
working, and moving away from the national tariff to longer term block contracts (a payment 
                                                          
2 Provider Sustainability Fund was a £2.5bn fund held by NHS England and NHS Improvement, which NHS 
providers could access if they hit certain financial and performance targets (ANANDACIVA, S. & WARD, D. 
2019. July 2019 quarterly monitoring report. The King’s Fund.) 
3 The national tariff sets the prices and rules that commissioners use to pay providers  for NHS services; in many 
cases, this is a price paid for each patient a provider sees or treats but the tariff also supports different payment 
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made to a provider to deliver a specific, usually broadly-defined, service) was seen as a major 
enabler of the collaborative working in the system. Some, but not all providers, had moved to 
block contract at the time of the research. It was also acknowledged that for block payments to 
incentivise collaboration required attitudinal changes, and the establishment of trusting 
relationships between providers, in order to reach agreement regarding the sharing of financial 
resources.  
The development of approaches to achieving break even position with respect of system control 
totals was taking place at both system and place level, with places commonly organised around 
main acute provider footprint and ‘tasked’ with keeping the provider within financial means, 
and system intervention across places. Place was seen as a logical footprint for sharing financial 
risk rather than the larger system footprint. There were some examples of the agreement of 
financial mechanisms at place level to facilitate the sharing of financial risk. In Case Study 3,  
one subsystem had put in place a contract with the main acute provider based on blended tariff 
as opposed to the national tariff, and a further subsystem was working towards agreeing a 
similar approach with their acute provider. In one place relying on pre-existing risk share 
arrangements agreed between CCGs and a struggling acute provider based on blended tariff 
approach was thought to have provided some helpful levers to achieve the required breakeven 
position. The use of Alliance agreements4 was also under discussion in a number of places as 
a possible mechanism to secure co-operation and the sharing of financial risk at place (see 
section 8).  
7.3 Local Authority involvement in action to achieve system financial sustainability 
It was acknowledged that the finances of local government and the NHS were intertwined (for 
example that the poor financial position of a LA would impact efforts to integrate health and 
social care services provision), and that LAs were important partners in achieving system 
financial sustainability. Experiences of partnering with LAs to achieve financial sustainability 
varied across the case studies. The different financial regimes across the NHS and local 
government impacted the way the two sectors could work together in systems to address their 
collective financial position.  The lack of requirement for NHS organisations to break even 
                                                          
approaches (NHS ENGLAND AND NHS IMPROVEMENT 2020h. Understanding and using the national tariff. 
London: NHS England and NHS Improvement.) 
4 An NHS Alliance agreement overlays but does not replace existing service contracts. It brings providers 
together around a common aspiration for joint working across the system, setting out shared objectives and 




(while LAs were required to balance their budgets) was a source of frustration for some LA 
partners. This interviewee, for example, viewed the NHS financial rules as lacking discipline 
and rigour, and also limiting their ability to invest in shared services: 
‘There's this constant tension of ‘Can you invest in this, can you do this, will you pay 
for that?’.  And as a partner, in principle I want to be able to say yes, that makes sense, 
but as a local authority corporate director, sometimes that becomes quite difficult 
because I don't have that money.’ (Local Authority Director 2, Case Study 3, February 
2020) 
Other further potential areas of tension in relation to the risks which local government was 
exposed to related to system initiatives aimed at achieving financial sustainability. These 
included the risk that moving acute activity out of hospital might increase the demand for social 
care services, concerns that savings would be directed solely to the NHS, a lack of enabling 
legislation that supported and promoted collaborative work, and the complexity of the 
mechanics of pooling budgets between LAs and NHS. Many of these tensions could be 
overcome through detailed specification and agreement of risk share arrangements, however 
the financial conditions within which LAs operate heightened the anxieties about how the 
limited council resources are being spent and who has control over it.  
 
While these tensions existed in all case studies, in Case Study 2 (the ICS), where the 
coterminous County Council held a system leadership position, novel opportunities to 
maximise the benefit of Council/ NHS partnership in innovative ways were being explored. 
The Council was viewed as having expertise in relation to service transformation and the 
achievement of financial sustainability which could be of value to the ICS. Also under 
discussion were a number of area wide strategies, encompassing health and local government 
concerning functions such as workforce, programme management, digital and technology and 
estates. For example, in relation to estates, a proposal under discussion with all key decision-
makers (e.g. NHS Property Services at a national level; Districts and Boroughs etc) was the 
development of a unified Estates and Assets Strategy for the area with all partners. The aim of 
such an arrangement was to rationalise estates, for example by moving some health services 
into other public buildings, thereby delivering significant savings to be reinvested into frontline 
services. Such arrangements were facilitated by the fact that the Council encompassed the ICS, 




7.4  Resource allocation decisions within systems 
There was an emerging role for systems as a ‘funnel’ (STP Director 1, Case Study 3) both top-
down for dispersal of central funding allocations and bottom-up for funding applications to the 
centre.  This was accompanied by an assumption that the system will have more say in the way 
central resources are allocated between the system partners, even if such resources have been 
pre-assigned centrally (such as for primary, community or mental health). 
There were examples of systems deciding the allocation of pots of national funding for 
particular services, rather than this being imposed on them. The Case Study 2 system had made 
a commitment to put more money into Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) 
despite the deficit position of a number of organisations.  The Case Study 3 system had reached 
local agreement regarding the allocation of funding for hospices, despite some initial 
opposition from the largest provider likely to lose out most on the scale of the funding: 
‘But what we did is we got all the hospices in the room, we got all the end of life 
commissioners in the room and said how do you want to do this? It was great. We 
planned it jointly. So it was a complete new world. It was like we didn’t do some ghastly 
contract discussion, we said, so, we know there’s problems, we know there’s 
workforce…how best should we do this? And they loved it. They were so pleased. They 
didn’t get what they’d have got, each of them. Some got less than they would have got 
on a capitation basis, but they were much happier because they’d helped design it.’ 
(STP Director 2, Case Study 3, February 2020) 
However, the difficulty of making such decisions was acknowledged. There was the perception 
of limited freedoms in systems in the light of NHS ‘must do’s’, and the challenge of securing 
agreement of system partners where some were being financially disadvantaged.  
A significant tranche of top-down allocations related to ‘transformation funding’. In relation to 
Case Study 2 (the ICS) in particular this funding had been substantial, and while half the money 
had been pre-allocated to national programmes, the ICS had complete autonomy over the 
remainder. System decisions regarding spend had been made through a structured process 
which had been agreed with NHSEI: 
‘So we had broad themes and then we asked for detailed bids against it and we had a 
whole investment framework agreed with a national team around business case 
approval and evaluation approaches’ (ICS Director 2, Case Study 2, March 2020) 
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This process resulted in the dedication of some funds to ‘support the bottom line’, and the 
remainder on transformation activities (the development of inter-organisational relationships , 
support for ‘place’ creation, service initiatives). It was acknowledged that this approach was 
rather ‘piecemeal’ and unsatisfactory in terms of impact. 
7.5  Sharing of resources between system partners 
Systems had agreed a number of initiatives to share resources in order to make best use of 
economies of scale, and to support each other.  
These included sharing staff (both managerial and clinical) between different providers and 
between providers and commissioners, with a view to helping to improve performance, sharing 
best practice and expertise where providers were struggling with service provision. Other 
significant shared resources were being put in place on a long term basis, such as a proposed 
joint staff bank.  In Case Study 2 the most significant of these shared resources was a virtual 
academy, conceptualised as an ‘incubation space’, established with the support of the 
Academic Health Science network. This was a resource shared across all system partners, 
which encouraged the adoption of shared approaches and learning across the system. The 
primary benefit of this initiative was to support and explore innovative approaches to 
networked learning across the system, places and neighbourhoods relating for example to the 
reduction of unwarranted variation across the system, and introduction of new national learning 
and best practice, such as developing population health management. The academy also 
developed leadership skills in key individuals particularly in relation to how to lead in systems 




8. Development of system governance 
 
Systems were developing local leadership and co-operative arrangements within a complex 
landscape of pre-existing organisational accountabilities.  Where system governance appeared 
most developed this was characterised by the development of system authority and 
accountability through making use of the existing organisational architecture with the 
assimilation of powers of statutory bodies into the system governance functions, and through 
the increasing formalisation of governance and accountability arrangements. This had the 
effect of ‘lending’ authority to the system, allowing system forums to make binding decisions 
without reference to other governance forums and also, through utilising existing governance 
actors and forums, mitigating the additional burden of the system in the existing governance 
landscape. 
 
8.1 Leadership of systems  
An important source of authority within the system for system leaders was the amalgamation 
of system leadership with leadership of statutory organisations. In both Case Studies 2 and 3 
CCG and system leadership was amalgamated, with the CCG Chief Officer also fulfilling a 
system leadership role. In Case Study 1, the outgoing STP lead saw the amalgamation of system 
and CCG roles an important source of influence over system partners: 
If I was to be an executive lead on my own, like without an organisation to back me up, 
I have no influence of any sort apart from purely trying to persuade people, because 
I’ve got no people and no money (…) I think to be without an organisation behind me 
makes it, well, nigh impossible, to be honest, especially if you were to come into conflict 
with the accountable officer at the CCG and have a different view on how you think 
things should develop. (STP Director 2, Case Study 1, December 2019)  
This approach was also evident elsewhere, with examples of CCG employed Directors 
appointed to dual system and place leadership roles.  Duality of system/CCG roles was 
acknowledged to invoke potential conflict of interests, and could be seen to elide CCG and 
system differences, and increase the opacity of decision making. However, for interviewees the 
benefits were thought to outweigh such potential complications.  
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In Case Study 2, where the County Council had near coterminosity with the system, the Council 
was an important further source of system authority. Significantly, a senior Council leader also 
held leadership posts in the system. Council partnership and leadership of the system was 
described as fulfilling an important outward facing function: 
‘So I think for an ICS to be successful, we need to be accountable to the population, 
and that’s why, the Council leader as a democratically elected politician brings that, 
and that’s why linking our strategy to the Health and Wellbeing Board, with elected 
members and all the rest of it…so that’s really important to me.’ (ICS Director 1, Case 
Study 2, January 2020) 
8.2 Alignment of system governance with partners’ statutory responsibilities  
A further instance of ‘lending’ of statutory authority from existing statutory bodies and 
functions was the alignment of system decision making with governance forums in which 
statutory responsibilities were discharged. This facilitated decision making in system forums 
which did not require approval elsewhere. This mechanism also mitigated the volume of forums 
member organisations were required to attend by ‘piggy backing’ system governance on 
existing forums where possible.  For example, a CCG forum could be expanded to include a 
wider system membership, and retain CCG statutory decision making powers. This approach 
was most widespread in Case Study 2, the ICS, where a number of system governance forums 
were amalgamated with existing CCG forums and provided assurance to the CCGs’ Governing 
Bodies for the discharge of CCG statutory duties. In other instances, ICS partners delegated 
powers and authority to ICS governance forums, for example giving authorisation to the ICS 
system to investigate activities, and seek information from partners, officers and/or employees.  
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) and Overview and Scrutiny Committees are relevant to 
the work of STPs and ICSs as they have statutory duties concerning the planning and delivery 
of services to address the health and wellbeing of the local population across the NHS, public 
health and local government. HWBs are a formal committee of LAs, which have a statutory 
duty, with CCGs, to produce a joint strategic needs assessment and a joint health and wellbeing 
strategy for the local population. Additionally, LAs are required by the Local Government Act 
2000 to scrutinize the provision of local health services (Local Government Act 2000) through 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees.    
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There was variability in the way our case study systems linked with these statutory forums. In 
Case Study 2, the HWB had a formal position in the ICS governance structure as the highest 
approval giving forum, and was recognised as the overall strategy setting body for the area.  In 
the other two case studies, due to the local geography in respect of local government 
configuration, HWBs were situated at place rather than system level. These did not appear to 
be prominent bodies in relation to ‘place’ governance, and it was noted in relation to Case 
Study 3 that the role of HWB at place was underdeveloped and unclear.  It is also the case that 
the function of HWBs as a decision-making body will always be tempered by the need for 
representatives to return to their own organisations for approval before decisions can be made. 
The role of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee in relation to the case study systems 
appeared less prominent at the time of the research 
8.3 Formalisation of system governance 
Systems had adopted formal commitments from partners to collaborative behaviour. In Case 
Studies 1 and 2 system partners had signed a Memorandum of Understanding. Memorandums 
of Understanding are not legally binding, and do not affect signatories’ accountability as 
individual organisations. The purpose of their adoption was to formalise the commitment of all 
partners of systems to work collaboratively, and the governance arrangements, including how 
decisions would be made, and principles which would be adhered to. Additionally, in Case 
Study 2 a Devolution Agreement was in place locally between the CCGs, the County Council, 
NHS England and NHS Improvement, focusing on the development of local control of health 
and care commissioning decisions and increasing alignment between NHS and local 
government commissioning responsibilities.  
 
A number of place based partnerships within the systems were developing various forms of 
formal contractual arrangements, such as Alliance agreements, as mechanisms to anchor their 
partnership arrangements.  The agreement of these arrangements was a matter for place level 
decision making, with the acceptance that each place would adopt whatever particular 
mechanism was most suited to the local context.  These alliances were at the early stages of 




9 System level governance structures 
Governance structures in the case study systems were in flux and subject to ongoing 
refinement. This fluidity reflected both the lack of prescription regarding governance 
arrangements and the developing system agenda, particularly refinement of governance 
structures in preparation for application for ICS status. The governance structures of systems 
were acknowledged as inherently complex, balancing potentially competing interests: that of 
representation/inclusivity and operational decision making; of accommodating both cross 
cutting pieces of work and issues specific to certain groups of organisations; and of the 
principle of subsidiarity and the need for oversight.  
9.1 System governance structures 
In response to the horizontal and informal nature of governance in systems, system leaders in 
both Case Study 2 and Case Study 3 wanted governance structures to reflect the difference of 
network led governance from hierarchical model of governance, and to recognise the 
sovereignty of partners: 
‘I’m trying to think about our communities being the leaves of the tree and the top and 
the roots being the, you know, NHS England sort of stuff …. but I think what we’ve been 
looking for is borough-based partnerships … very much linked in to community and 
actually even further down to that because… whether you call it a neighbourhood or 
network or local area partnership, actually… […]  the local lead ward councillor is very 
much part of that structure.’ (STP Director 1, Case Study 3, February 2020) 
Important principles for decision making in systems were the use of consensus decision making 
and the principle of subsidiarity (decision taken closest to those it affects). Despite the 
recognition of the differences of network governance from vertical governance, system 
governance structures mirrored vertical governance structures as systems sought to achieve 
oversight of activities, for instance with approvals required at system level for some decisions 
made at place level. The formalisation of a hierarchical relationship between place and system 
formed part  of systems’ work to progress arrangements and responsibility for ‘oversight’ in 
line with the System Maturity Matrix (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2019b).  
Within the three case study systems there was a proliferation of governance forums, which 
were multi-layered at various spatial scales. In the two STPs (Case Studies 1 and 3), the 
governance structures were formally under review in anticipation of application for ICS status. 
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In Case Study 2, the ICS, the governance structure had already undergone significant 
refinement, with input from a governance specialist as part of the process of gaining ICS status.   
The following outlines the key structures in place in the three case studies at the time of the 
research. Figure 3 (below) summarises the key governance structures at system level in the 
case study sites. Section 10 presents the experiences of system partners of decision making 
within these structures.  
9.2 Partnership Boards 
The NHS Long Term Plan specified that each system should establish a Partnership Board  
with participants ‘drawn from and representing’ commissioners, trusts, primary care networks, 
and local authorities, the voluntary and community sector and other partners’ (NHS England, 
2019). In the case study systems, decision making remained the remit of a smaller group of 
commissioners and providers of health and social care services, with a wider group of 
organisations engaged in other ways. 
In Case Study 1, the STP Partnership Board membership consisted solely of the statutory 
providers and commissioners of health and care services, with remit to also proactively engage 
organisations within the wider local health and social care system. In Case Study 2, the Health 
and Wellbeing Board (HWB), which had an existing wide membership including those with 
influence over the wider causes of health inequalities, such as employment, transport and 
housing, was designated as the system Partnership Board. A further system-specific Board with 
a smaller membership drawn from the commissioners and main providers of health and social 
care services reported into the HWB. In Case Study 3, the Partnership Board was defunct at 
the time of the fieldwork. There were varying rationales for this including sheer size of 
membership, but also lack of clarity about the function of the Board and around how to achieve 
representation. 
Where formal Terms of Reference for these Boards were obtained (Case Studies 1 and 2), these 
reflected the permissive policy context in relation to governance, differing for example in the 
degree of specificity regarding processes of decision making and conflict resolution, such as 
whether decisions could be only reached by consensus or by simple majority. The Terms of 
Reference reflected the sovereignty of member organisations and the informal status of 
decision making.  Case Study 2 had increased the formality of decision making to a degree 
through the designation of the statutory HWB as the Partnership Board. However, while having 
a statutory duty, HWBs themselves have very limited formal powers, and are constituted as 
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partnership forums. It was also the case that before being presented to the HWB for ratification 
all matters were first discussed and agreed (or vetoed) at the system specific Board. However, 
the designation of the HWB as the Partnership Board also ensured that the work of the system 
had a degree of public transparency.  
9.3 Other system level governance forums 
Reflecting the permissive policy context around system governance, each case study had a 
different approach to the structure of system level governance outside the Partnership Board. 
Notwithstanding local differentiation, several consistent factors can be noted. 
In all our case studies, an Executive Group existed at system level. These were important 
forums, in two case studies (Case Studies 2 and 3) they were arguably the main decision-
making forum.  These Executive Groups held other system forums to account and reported to 
the Partnership Board (where it existed). They were distinguished from the Partnership Boards 
by a smaller membership, focused on senior Directors of the main provider organisations, the 
LA, CCG and system leadership. These were operationally focused groups, consisting of 
‘anybody who can get fired’ (ICS Director 1, Case Study 2, January 2020).  
The case study systems structured system activities through a workstream based approach, with 
system level governance forums across particular functions such as finance, quality and 
workforce. However, this cross-cutting focus was balanced with the inclusion of special 
interest groups based on profession or organisational type, indicating the need to balance 















10.  System governance in practice 
Systems were working to mitigate weak decision making, complexity of decision making 
structures, and the burden of participation. Overall the governance structures of systems were 
a challenging environment in which to make binding decisions, particularly those of a 
contentious nature.  In the current legislative environment, some interviewees still doubted that, 
given the current legislative environment, partners would prioritise the interests of the system 
above individual roles, accountabilities and statutory responsibilities when faced with 
decisions significantly against organisational interests, although it did not appear that this 
conflict had been significantly tested in practice. 
10.1 Decision making and soft power 
In practice, decision making in systems relied on the exertion of ‘soft’ power. As described in 
the preceding sections, systems were putting mechanisms in place to increase the expectation 
that decisions will be adhered to, both through ‘piggy backing’ on existing authority of member 
organisations, and through the formalisation of relational norms in documents such as Terms 
of Reference and Memorandum of Understanding. These mechanisms were supplementary to 
the operation of ‘soft’ power by system leaders and within systems, a power that ‘aims to 
attract rather than coerce’ (Mulderrig, 2011). It was recognised that power lay in the ability 
of the system leader or partners to influence the decisions of others. System leaders spent a 
considerable portion of their time building relationships and trust across system partners, so 
they exerted personal, informal authority and leadership within the system, and it was 
recognised that system leaders could not ‘come in cold’ and expect to run a system, as you 
‘have to have some history to build on’ (ICS Director 1, Case Study 2, January 2020). The 
consequence of new external leadership would be subjecting systems to volatility when leaders 
change. 
 
Interviewees described the contrast between the ‘soft power’ of systems and the hard power of 
existing accountability arrangements as inhibiting system decision making. System partners 
were largely keen to co-operate within the system and adopt and abide by shared decision 
making. While acknowledging the expectation that partners will act in good faith, and will not 
overturn decisions made in meetings, partners were also cognisant that decisions made in 




‘Because of its legal framework or lack of, you can go into that room and you can agree 
to anything you like. And you can walk out and no-one’s going to hold you to account 
for it. And I think quite often, we go in and then you go back to your organisation and 
the Finance Director probably says – not just in my organisation but the rest of them –
‘Don’t be ridiculous, what have you said that for?’ So I think that the rules are pretty 
hazy to be honest.’ (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 2, December 2019) 
System partners were aware that accountability lay with the individual organisations for 
operational and financial performance. It was recognised that there were limits to persuasion 
as a lever, particularly around difficult conversations such as those concerning acute service 
reconfiguration. From this perspective the lack of a statutory basis for systems was a significant 
problem, and there was general agreement that the uncertainty around the proposals for 
legislative change should be resolved in order to clarify the ‘rules’ to “avoid it being like 
treacle” (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 3, January 2020).  
However, while there was considerable uncertainty regarding the status of system decisions, 
we did not find examples of system partners defecting from system decisions that had been 
made, or indeed of making difficult decisions and choosing not to defect. This corresponds 
with a sense that, as yet, the decision-making structures in the case study systems had not been 
tested with having to make a serious decision with resource implications, and that the forums 
were currently a site for discussion and debate. 
10.2  Clarity of decision making 
There were further challenges to system governance. A significant issue was the lack of clarity 
about the governance structures themselves: where decisions were to be made and by whom. 
System governance structures were complex, and were inserted within a pre-existing 
governance landscape. Furthermore, given the lack of national ‘blueprint’ regarding system 
governance structures, including at place level, there was the possibility for a great deal of 
variation in structures. The delegation of decision-making functions from statutory 
organisations, and the amalgamation of existing committees with system forums, served to 
streamline arrangements, but also had the potential to increase opacity. Additionally, across 
our case studies, governance structures were in flux, continually revised as leaders attempted 
to refine system governance: 
‘Achieving clarity over where you make decisions, who makes decisions, and then who 
enacts them is really difficult, and you often only find out you’ve got it wrong by doing 
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it…this is bottom up, and it’s to take into account statutory body decision making, trying 
to make use of architecture that was already there, and then linking it all together.  And 
every time we do it, we find other bits that we then add in, because it’s just reflective of 
the size of the remit of an ICS’ (ICS Director 1, Case Study 2, January 2020) 
A consequence of this cycle of refinement was often that written governance documentation 
was out of date, and that many iterations existed which did not aid clarity for those on the 
ground. Examples of this lack of clarity included confusion and disagreement between system 
partners about the ‘seat of power’ at system level, and confusion regarding the purpose of 
certain forums.  
10.3 Inclusivity  
Systems prioritised inclusivity, subsidiarity and consensus in decision making, and these 
principles were widely supported, but acknowledged to carry challenges. There were issues 
inherent in bringing many diverse organisations round a single table. Interviewees warned 
against systems turning into large, multi-layered, unmanageable structures with many veto 
players. 
Bringing diverse organisations together to make decisions was necessarily complex due to 
differences of interests. While organisations were keen to collaborate, working together 
effectively required the development of trusting relationships, and sensitive negotiation over 
time of various non-aligned interests and power differentials. These dynamics were observed 
to delay decision making: 
I mean, I think the useful thing about that group is having all the partners in the room. 
The not very useful piece about it is having all the partners in the room....You can 
probably write on a small piece of paper actually the outcomes from that meeting. And 
the trouble is that whilst you’re getting it set up and while people are bedding in and 
worried about losing their power they have all got to be there. And the result of that is 
you don’t move forward very far (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 2, December 2019) 
It was feared that, in large systems, having many people round the table may stifle decision 
making and make the meetings unmanageable (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 3, January 
2020). This dynamic was further exacerbated by the widespread adoption of consensus decision 
making processes in many system forums. In some instances, as described in Section 9, this 
dynamic was being managed through a split in system governance between larger forums 
58 
 
aimed at representation (for instance the Partnership Board), and smaller groups which had an 
operational decision making focus.  
A further phenomenon experienced by system partners was the burden of leadership and 
participation on a finite group of local leaders. In one case study, for example, it was reported 
they had run out of senior leaders to lead the work streams. A senior leader elsewhere described 
the significant burden of representation required to embed the system: 
‘ I mean, I could never be in this office to be honest with you. And that’s one of the 
feedbacks. We’ve just done some of the executive work, and the chap leading it said to 
me this week, oh, you know, the directors say they wish you were in the Trust more. 
They understand why you can’t be, but they wish you were in the Trust more. And I 
do…I mean, as I say, I could not be here all the time.’ (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 
2, December 2019)  
An approach being considered to address both the size of governance forums and the burden 
of representation was a consolidation of the number of representatives on governance forums. 
This was being considered variously regarding a proposal of ‘one voice for each place’ 
whereby each ‘place’ would have three seats on the Partnership Board, and one vote per place, 
and the consolidation of PCN representation through an elected lead clinical director. These 
arrangements were not in place at the time of the fieldwork, and their success was thought to 




11. The division of functions between systems and places 
Governance structures were multi-layered with formal decision making structures at different 
spatial scales. An important aspect of the development of system governance is the co-
ordination of decision making across system and place in line with the principle of subsidiarity, 
and the reconciliation of local priorities with the wider priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. 
This section describes the way systems were developing the relationship between system and 
place. As this issue is crucial to the effective operation of systems, the relationship between 
system and place is a focus of the second phase of this research, and will be reported on in 
more detail in the final report. 
11.1 Place level governance structures 
There were varying degrees of formality and uniformity of governance at place level. While 
Case Studies 1 and 2 had adopted governance forums at system and place levels, Case Study 3 
had departed significantly from these spatial scales, and governance structures existed at 
system, sub-system and LA levels.  Systems were seeking to balance sensitivity to existing 
local governance structures and local preferences with the need to ensure clarity of decision-
making processes and, increasingly, to be able to provide ‘assurance’.   In Case Study 2, which 
was already an ICS, governance arrangements were formalised at place level, each place had 
its own Board, with Terms of Reference and clearly defined remits of decision making, 
including formal rules regarding the delegation of funds, and centralised governance support. 
In the other two case studies there was markedly less formality and uniformity. Case Study 3 
was notable in its attitude towards divergence, with the intent that the three subsystems would 
be free to determine their internal governance arrangements. In some areas partnership 
governance structures were more mature at the subsystem level, with the partnership 
governance structures at the constitutive borough footprints weak or non-existent, and in others 
vice versa.  
The potential for diversity in governance at place level within systems provoked unease in 
some interviewees regarding the development of new silos and divisions within the wider 
system, reflected by perceptions of tension between places, a lack of willingness to work 
together, and concerns that emerging differences between ways of operating and organising at 




11.2 Division of functions between system and place 
Many interviewees acknowledged that it remains challenging to get the division of 
responsibilities “right” between levels (Acute Trust 3 CEO, Case Study 3), and that this was an 
area where systems had considerable discretion to shape arrangements.   
The drive to establish partnership working at the lowest possible level, in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity, was hampered by a lack of clarity on how to distribute power, resources and 
responsibilities between different levels of governance.  It was therefore difficult to ascertain 
what subsidiarity meant in practice in terms of the division of functions between spatial scales. 
There was a move towards increasing formalisation of responsibilities to resolve this lack of 
clarity. This was particularly the case with the ICS case study (Case Study 2), where part of 
the process of gaining ICS status had been the formalisation of links between places and the 
system. Even so, the division of functions and responsibilities was described as a “struggle”, 
with responsibilities bouncing between systems and places.  
The division of functions between spatial scales reflected the need to ‘go with the grain’ as far 
as possible, with layering of system structures over local landscapes, including the size and 
scale of organisations and diverse historical partnership arrangements, which were far from 
uniform.  In Case Study 1, where there were multiple LAs in the system, place was preferred 
as the focus of engagement with local authorities. In contrast in Case Study 2, where the County 
Council boundary largely reflected the system boundary, place was seen as focused on the 
acute hospital agenda and configured based on patient flows rather than geographically 
constituted. In Case Study 3, where a two tier sub system/place footprint existed, sub-systems 
were seen as focused on the acute hospital agenda, and place was the focus of engagement with 
LAs. Organisational footprints also influenced the division of functions through the location 
and remit of staff. For example, the organisation of performance monitoring on the basis of 
CCG footprints reflecting pre-existing arrangements. 
In all case studies the division of functions was still an ongoing and challenging task, where 
the principle of subsidiarity was said to be at times in tension with the need for the achievement 
of change at scale and a desire for uniformity across the system. An example of this tension in 
Case Study 2 was in deciding whether the leadership of service transformation should be 
through the establishment of a transformation unit at system level, or whether each place or 
organisation should lead its own transformation activities.  
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Table 4 provides examples, drawn from interviews, of the division of functions between system 
and place in the case study sites. This list is not definitive as there was the ongoing work and 
lack of clarity regarding the division of functions on the ground. Despite the ongoing challenges 
of finding the ‘right’ division of functions and the differentiation due to local context, there 
were some cross case study consistencies emerging regarding the allocation of some functions. 
Place seemed consistently to be the level at which the interaction between social care, 
primary/community and acute care took place, where integration at service level was driven 
forward and there was a focus for improving population health. Cross cutting work 
programmes which would benefit from economies of scale were driven at system level 
including workforce, IT, finance, maternity and cancer services, and standard setting was also 
a key function situated solely at system level. The list reveals areas of duplication across place 
and system, such as workforce strategy and engagement of wider partners. These areas of 
duplication may contribute to the perception of a lack of clarity, but also may reflect the 
necessity of ownership at both levels. 
11.3  Commissioning across systems and places  
 
Commissioning organisations were exercising their statutory functions in the context of wider 
system working. The location of commissioning activities varied across case studies reflecting 
the local organisational landscape. 
In the case study systems, CCGs were taking collaborative commissioning decisions on a pan-
CCG footprint through the use of ‘committees in common’. The ‘committee in common’ is a 
mechanism to achieve co-ordinated decision making across organisations by which multiple 
organisations each establish their own committee with delegated authority to make certain 
decisions, and those committees meet together at the same time, with the same remit, and where 
possible identical membership to co-ordinate decisions. Each committee remains accountable 
to its own board.   
Structures to allow co-ordinated commissioning decisions across CCGs and LAs were also 
being developed.  Case Study 2 had established a Joint Commissioning Committee of the 
system CCGs and the County Council. It was enabled through the establishment in each CCG 
of a County-wide Commissioning Committee which met in Common with a Commissioning 
Committee established by the County Council, and underpinned by a variety of Section 75 
Agreements such as the Better Care Fund. This arrangement was part of the commitment to 
progressive devolution in the Devolution Agreement between the system CCGs, the County 
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Council, NHS England and NHS Improvement. The Committee had jurisdiction over the 
decision-making of the County Council health-related commissioning functions, and some 
decision making for CCGs according to a scheme of differential delegation per CCG. Draft 
Terms of Reference for the Committee-in-Common suggest in scope areas including mental 
health, learning disabilities, continuing health care, children (including mental health) and the 
Better Care Fund.  
In Case Study 3, LAs were non-voting members of the system wide Joint Commissioning 
Committee, and, reflecting the local context, integrated commissioning with LAs was situated 
at the borough/place level through pooled funding through Section 75 agreements such as the 
Better Care Fund. 
Not all commissioning could be carried out at ICS level, and it was necessary to make 
commissioning decisions at the place level too. Some anticipated the progression towards a 
single CCG per system would lead to significant changes in commissioning at place level 
through the delegation of some commissioning budgets and decisions to places, and a 
concentration of CCG leadership at system rather than place scale. Indeed, in Case Study 2, 
when a single pan-system CCG was formed at the end of the Phase 1 research period, the CCG 
Governing Body established a Local Commissioning Committee for each place, which 
discharged CCG decisions delegated to it and met as part of each ‘place’ Board meeting. These 
type of commissioning arrangements were perceived by some to be subject to provider, rather 
than commissioner, leadership due to the predominance of provider leadership in many places. 
The development of commissioning at system and place scales will be addressed further in the 





or in place) 
System Place 
Leadership Uniting partners behind common core vision 
Facilitating collaborative working 
Getting all partners onboard for the decisions 
Providing leadership of place 
 
Population health  Population health interventions 
Mapping population needs 
Service provision and 
planning 
 
Leadership of system transformation 
Delivery of service transformation programmes in partnership 
with organisations 
Development of pan system initiatives (e.g. pathology network, 
digital programmes)  
Leadership of transformation of acute services provision  
Engagement with specialist commissioning 
Planning some specialist services (childrens’, mental health) 
Leadership and delivery of service transformation programs (including 
moving services out of hospital, primary, community care) 
Developing service integration between social, primary, community and acute 
care 
Developing integrated services to address wider population needs (e.g. 
improving access to adequate housing) 
 
 
Workforce strategy Creating workforce strategy  
Workforce recruitment and retention 
Workforce development 
Workforce recruitment and retention 





Bidding for resources from NHSEI 
Prioritising capital requests to NHSEI 
Delivering a balanced and sustainable budget 
Allocation of central funding to system partners/places 
Developing approaches to collective sharing of financial risks 
Action to achieve place financial recovery plan 
Taking decisions regarding funding allocated to place by system 
Developing approaches to collective sharing of financial risks 
Agreement of financial recovery with acute provider 
Submission of business cases to system 
Governance 
 
Developing focus on place rather than organisation 
Overseeing CCG mergers 
Developing system membership 
Monitoring of performance and holding to account 
Developing focus on place rather than organisation 
Monitoring of performance and holding to account 
 
Involvement of wider 
partners 
 
Engagement with non-NHS statutory and third sector 
organisations  
Improving voluntary sector representation 
 
Involving local people in service redesign 
Engagement with Local Authorities 
Engagement/collaboration with other local statutory organisations (police, fire 
service, schools etc.) and third sector providers (e.g. housing associations) 
Table 4: Actual or postulated division of functions between system and place (from interviews) 
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12  Accountability within systems  
Accountability relationships in systems can be categorised as firstly vertical (and formal): 
holding to account of the system, system leaders and (NHS) system partners for system 
performance by NHSEI, but secondly also horizontal (and informal) within systems: the 
holding to account of system partners by each other (Bovens, 2007). The development of 
horizontal accountability between system partners is an important way of facilitating local 
strategic decisions and their implementation, and the development of a new emphasis in 
vertical accountability between systems and regulators is an important mechanism in realising 
the maturity of ICSs. This section discusses the development of vertical and horizontal 
accountability in the case study systems.  
 
The question of how systems were accountable, to whom and for what was far from settled, 
with an increase in actors with accountability relationships, emerging horizontal 
accountabilities between system partners, and a shift in the performance of vertical 
accountabilities as systems matured. Level 4, Thriving ICS’s are expected to lead the 
‘assurance’ of individual organisations, and agree and co-ordinate any Trust or CCG 
intervention carried out by NHSEI, with regional teams taking the stance of a ‘critical 
friend’(NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2019b). 
This developing landscape made things unclear on the ground, with the potential for confusion 
about the enactment of accountabilities between the system, the regulator, providers and places. 
However, the shift in the emphasis in the relationship with NHSEI was welcomed by NHS 
partners, along with the opportunity for the development of self-assurance arrangements, 
whereby system partners would undertake peer review with increased responsibility for 
oversight situated within systems. 
  
12.1 Vertical accountabilities  
 
Interviewees in NHS commissioners and providers welcomed the changing relationship with 
the regional NHSEI function, characterised as a move away from the ‘old’ culture of aggressive 
performance management and its replacement with a more inclusive and supportive culture. 
System leaders described a high frequency of contact and of an ‘alongside’ relationship, in 
which systems and NHSEI worked together. There were many points of contact between 
NHSEI and systems. NHSEI conducted regular assurance meetings with systems. For example, 
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in Case Study 1 a process of quarterly system reviews between NHSEI and the system was 
described, which linked to the performance management of, for example, four hour waiting 
target or financial performance outcomes, as well as an engagement with systems around the 
sign off of plans and capital proposals. Additionally, case studies reported weekly and 
fortnightly scheduled contact between NHSEI and system leadership teams. NHSEI was also 
a presence in system governance forums. In the ICS case study (Case Study 2) a regional 
NHSEI representative attended system forums as an observer and was required for the meetings 
to be quorate. This approach was welcomed by the ICS leadership, as performing an assurance 
function. NHSEI were also welcomed as an enabler, who could use hierarchical power when 
ICS ‘soft power’ was not sufficient. 
The emerging ‘alongside’ relationship between systems and the regional NHSEI made it less 
clear to some interviewees how systems were held to account.  A CCG Director in Case Study 
3 expressed confusion regarding accountability for system failure: 
‘So, I’m slightly less clear about how a failing ICS is held to account. So either at some 
point NHS England has a cut-off point where they say, we’ve done all the support we 
can, we now go back into regulatory mode, ICS, you account to us or at some point they 
step that back. But they have been part of that joint process so I don’t quite see how 
that works yet and I think this hasn’t been thought through, or maybe you end up in 
front of the national team collectively, region and ICS.  I don’t know what that is.’  
(CCG 1 Director, Case Study 3, January 2020) 
An ICS leader’s view in Case Study 2 was that the primary vertical accountability for system 
performance was the formal personal accountability of system leaders through the NHS 
hierarchy for the transformation of the system and for the delivery of quality, financial and 
constitutional standards. The sanction in the case of poor performance was understood to be 
that they could be removed from their posts, and also a wider sanction against the system could 
be imposed through the roll back of devolved responsibilities.  
Interviewees anticipated that, as systems matured, NHSEI would work with and through 
systems in relation to performance oversight of NHS system partners. Systems described the 
adoption by NHSEI of a ‘system first’ approach. One of the functions of this approach was the 
treatment of system leadership as the first point of contact and as the default focus of co-
ordination efforts, rather than individual organisations with whom NHSEI had a vertical 
accountability relationship. However, system partners found this approach was enacted 
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unevenly, and that NHSEI approaches via either the system or to member organisations directly 
appeared relatively arbitrarily distributed, giving system partners few clues as to how the 
accountability relationships were structured in practice, and causing ‘confusion and 
aggravation’ among system partners (STP Director 2, Case Study 1, December 2019). This 
dynamic was pronounced in the ICS case study, reflecting the expectation of increased self-
assurance associated with ICS status. Indeed, the perception of one Trust leader was that ICS 
status had exacerbated, rather than diminished, direct contact from NHSEI: 
‘ The other interesting thing about it is of course the presence of NHSEI and one of the 
things I would really pull out of this is ever since we have got a bit more devolved…so 
[the system leader’s] got the responsibility, accountability, I’ve never seen so much of 
NHSI or E. I’ve never had so many letters telling me what to do. They should be asking 
[the system leader] for the assurance about me, not asking me to report back to them. 
And they still can’t…’  (Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 2, December 2019) 
A further significant vertical accountability relationship relating to systems was for quality of 
services between the CQC and system partners. In contrast with the increasing focus on the 
system by NHSEI, at the time of fieldwork, the CQC focus was reported to be fixed on 
individual partners. In July 2020 (after the fieldwork) the CQC announced a series of Provider 
Collaboration Reviews, focused on partnership working in response to COVID-19. These 
reviews, and the developing accountability relationship between systems and the CQC, will be 
included in the second stage of fieldwork. 
12.2 Horizontal accountabilities – holding system partners to account 
Interviewees described a double running of oversight functions between system leaders and the 
regional function of NHSEI, in which systems were taking an increasing role in system 
assurance alongside NHSEI. The vertical accountability of NHS bodies to NHSEI for 
performance was supplemented by a developing system role in relation to the oversight of 
individual organisations’ performance, and the understanding within systems that they were 
encouraged wherever possible by NHSEI to ‘consume our own smoke as regards to 
performance management’(Acute Trust 1 CEO, Case Study 3, January 2020).  There was a 
shift from bilateral performance management meetings between provider and regulator to 
trilateral ‘assurance’ meetings involving systems. Horizontal accountabilities were developing 
at place level, with the notion firstly, that places could hold place partners to account for 
performance, and secondly that places (rather than individual providers) could be held to 
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account by systems. In the ICS (Case Study 2), places were subject to quarterly performance 
assurance visits from a system ‘assurance’ team. There were also accounts of places being 
recognised by NHSEI as actors that could be subject to performance monitoring and held to 
account.  
 
Instead of the use of direct sanctions for poor performance, the developing system assurance 
function concerned open information exchange about organisational performance which could 
serve as an incentive to improve.  Systems were developing the information systems necessary 
to understand performance, quality and finance across the system, and to facilitate open 
discussion. It was acknowledged to be a difficult task due to the size and scale of the data 
involved across systems.  There were concerns about how efficient and systematic the self-
monitoring process could be considering the resources available to systems to carry out this 
function.  
While interviewees were positive about the development of horizontal accountability,  this was 
tempered by acknowledgement of the limits of the ‘soft’ power to hold partners to account. In 
Case Study 2, there were examples of scrutiny of organisational performance within ‘places’ 
by place partners, and resultant action being agreed, for example acting to address a provider’s 
declining A and E performance through increasing support from primary care. However 
significant examples of holding to account within systems, for instance in relation to poor 
performance, were lacking in Phase 1 of the research. 
 
12.3 Accountability to the public 
Unlike statutory bodies, ICS and STPs have no formal accountability to the population. Formal 
accountability to the public for system decisions was understood by interviewees to lie with 
those partners which held a legal duty to involve the public in the exercise of their statutory 
functions, through, for example, holding board meetings in public. In Case Study 2, the 
embeddedness of the County Council (whose primary accountability was to the local resident 
population and elected politicians) in system leadership and governance, specifically through 
County Council leadership, and the designation of the HWB as the Partnership Board, was 




An understanding of the needs of local patients and communities underlies the aims of systems, 
particularly those around population health and the development of local partnerships. The case 
study systems were developing routes to public engagement of various kinds, seeking to 
understand the priorities, needs and preferences of the population. Public engagement activities 
also carried a spatial dimension, and were not necessarily centred on the system. As the analysis 
of the division of functions between systems and places in Section 11 indicates, the 
involvement of wider representatives was also situated at place level.   
Each case study system had established citizens’ panels with varied aims, such as in Case Study 
1 to start a public debate about allocation of limited resources (STP Director 2, Case Study 1, 
December 2019). The ICS (Case Study 2) had established various ongoing initiatives to embed 
citizen engagement in the development of ICS programmes. These included public engagement 
research to understand residents’ opinions on a range of health and wellbeing issues, and a 








13 The system role in the COVID-19 response 
 
The fieldwork reported in this report ceased at the time of the first lockdown period due to 
COVID-19. However, phase two of fieldwork commenced in August 2020, and a small number 
of initial interviews were conducted which focused on the system role in the COVID response. 
It is valuable to consider the way organisational collaboration necessitated by the health and 
social care response to COVID has driven and influenced system working, and can add to our 
understanding of system working. A brief summary of the findings in this regard are detailed 
here, and a fuller discussion of the system working  in the response to COVID will be included 
in the final report for this study.  
Due to the non-statutory nature of STPs and ICSs there were very few roles in relation to the 
response to COVID-19 which were allocated formally to ICS and STPs by NHSE/I. The 
NHSE/I letter ‘Reducing burden and releasing capacity at NHS providers and commissioners’ 
(NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020c) set out the arrangements for governance, 
reporting and assurance during the pandemic response in order to free up management capacity. 
This letter stated that organisations should:   
“Put on hold all national System by Default development work (including work on CCG 
mergers and 20/21 guidance). However, NHSE/I actively encourages system working 
where it helps manage the response to COVID-19,  providing support where possible.” 
A small number of co-ordination roles were suggested for ICSs and STPs in national 
documents. These included: that each STP/ICS should have a nominated lead who can make 
enquiries into  (personal protective equipment) stock capacity from local hospitals and other 
care providers which can be shared as ‘mutual aid’ (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 
2020a); that ICS/STPs may be the lead for co-ordination between Independent Sector providers 
and other providers in a region, and form an Independent Sector co-ordination network (NHS 
England and NHS Improvement, 2020d); and that ICS/STPs are part of the major incident 
escalation procedure in NHS Trusts (‘concerns including, but not limited to, workforce, 
infrastructure, estates or equipment’) (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020g). 
In our case studies, system involvement as a co-ordinating force varied. In Case Studies 2 and 
3 we found that the system played a co-ordination role in relation to the COVID-19 response. 
In Case Study 1, it appeared that the STP had not been a significant co-ordinating force, 
however we were not able to obtain an interview in Phase 1 of the research to explore the role 
70 
 
of the system, if any, in that regard. Spatial scales and local context shaped the role that systems 
played in relation to COVID-19. Interestingly, it was suggested that the division between what 
should occur at system or place level was much less contentious in relation to COVID-19 
response than in everyday system business. An interviewee in Case Study 2 suggested that 
much of the service change to adjust for COVID-19 occurred at place level, and was led by 
national models so bypassed system planning and decision making.  
In Case Study 2, the ICS had a significant role in co-ordination. It was suggested the NHSEI 
region wanted the ICS to be the first point of contact (gold command). Board papers suggest 
that this was because scale of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF)5 meant that the NHS needed 
a response on a scale larger than CCGs and smaller than NHSEI regions, and therefore the ICS 
was asked to represent the local NHS at Strategic Co-ordinating Group meetings. This was not 
contrary to statutory responsibilities as the CCG and ICS were very closely aligned, and by this 
time were coterminous. The ICS, with CCG support, set up the Incident Co-ordination Centre, 
and a Strategic Incident Management Group comprising the ICS Executive Directors and key 
leads chaired by the ICS SRO / Chief Officer. This structure linked both the LRF Command, 
control and co-ordination structure and the NHS England national structure through daily 
regional incident calls with south east systems leaders. From later in the response, a 
multiagency group, including colleagues from the LRF was set up in CCG offices.  
Organisations in Case Studies 2 and 3 worked together at levels most sensible given the 
function in question, including system level when appropriate. Interestingly, it was reported 
that partnership working was easier during the crisis, and that the need to work together in the 
response to COVID-19 improved relationships between system partners: 
‘I think we’ve all embraced the response to the crisis, we’ve all embraced having a 
different type of decision making in a single focus that we can all get together behind 
                                                          
5 Local resilience forums ( LRFs ) are multi-agency partnerships made up of representatives from local public 
services, including the emergency services, local authorities, the NHS, the Environment Agency and others. The 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Contingency Planning Regulations 2005 (Regulations) provide that 





so I think they’ve all been strengthened in that regard’.  (ICS Director 2, Case Study 
2, July 2020) 
‘And effectively we've used our response to COVID as a way of really getting people 
to work even more close together than they have been before.’ (STP Director 2, Case 
Study 3, August 2020) 
The need for organisations to work together in an operational rather than strategic way was 
thought to have deepened relationships between organisations beyond strategic relationships at 
Director level, bringing ‘the level and multiplicity of relationships between organisations into 
the system in a way that was a bit theoretical before.’ (CCG Director 2, Case Study 3, August 
2020). For example, there was a need operationally for  Intensive Care teams to work together, 
and for PPE leads to work together.  
The COVID-19 response had also impacted on collaboration at system level. A significant 
factor in this regard was the change in the financial regime, specifically the move to block 
contract payments ‘on account’ for all NHS trusts and foundation trusts, with suspension of the 
usual PBR national tariff payment architecture and associated administrative/ transactional 
processes (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020e).  which had in effect ‘completely 
rewritten the rulebook for this year’  (ICS Director 2, Case Study 2, July 2020). 
In Case Study 3, the COVID-19 response appeared to provide the impetus to streamline 
decision making, allowing decisions to be made in a clearer way without ‘going through five 
different committees before it got there’ (STP Director 2, Case Study 3, August 2020) and was 
described as ‘liberating’. New forums based on the COVID-19 response replaced system 
forums and ways of working. In Case Study 3 it was reported that a fundamental shift was the 
allocation of pan-organisation responsibilities (according to ‘cells’) rather than organisation 
responsibilities, based on areas of expertise. This approach was reported to work particularly 
well as it increased interdependences between organisations: 
 ‘So, for example [Acute Trust], they became the sector lead organisation and chair for the 
cell around personal protective equipment.  We had somebody from within a CCG led on 
estates and oxygen.  And we tried to divvy up those responsibilities across the partnership 
so that we had different people leading on different things depending on the expertise of 
their staff but also as a way in which to kind of draw us into being part of a whole.  
Everyone had some skin the game.  Everyone’s success was predicated on everyone else 
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playing and also you playing into whatever was your strength.’ (CCG Director 2, Case 
Study 3, August 2020)  
 
Some system wide sharing of resources was necessitated by the COVID response. The main 
examples given concerned the redeployment of clinical staff to cover shortages, and of other 
staff to support testing, system leadership of the formal mutual aid system for PPE, and sharing 





This report presents the interim findings from the first stage of research to investigate the 
further development of STPs and ICSs or their successors in order to find out how effective 
these new forms of collaboration are in achieving their goals, and what factors influence this. 
the objectives of the study are to find out: 
1. How the local leadership and cooperative arrangements with stakeholders (statutory, 
independent and community-based, including local authorities) are governed in the light of 
the ICS governance recommendations in the LTP. How statutory commissioning 
organisations including local authorities are facilitating local strategic decisions and their 
implementation; and whether different types of commissioning function are evolving at 
different system levels.  
2. Whether ICSs are able to allocate resources more efficiently across sectoral boundaries and 
bring their local health economies into financial balance.  
3. How individual organisations are reconciling their role in an ICS with their individual roles, 
accountabilities and statutory responsibilities.  
4. How national regulators are responding to the changes in modes of planning and 
commissioning and actual service configurations, in the light of the changed priorities for 
these regulators set out in the LTP. 
5. Which mechanisms are used to commission services in ICSs. In particular, how is 
competition used to improve quality and/or value for money of services; and are more 
complex forms of contract (such as alliancing) being used? How are local organisations 
reconciling new service configurations with current/evolving pricing structures, and thus 
how are financial incentives being used? 
6. How locality priorities, including those of local authorities, are reconciled with the wider 
priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. In particular, how is co-ordination achieved between 
STP and ICS plans, local priorities and existing programmes of work such as any local new 
models of care? 
This section discusses the research findings, and is structured as follows:  
• A summary of the interim findings  
• A discussion of interim findings  




14.1 Summary of interim research findings 
 
Local leadership and collaborative arrangements are developing within a complex local and 
national landscape of pre-existing governance arrangements, structural tensions between the 
NHS and local government, and a regulatory and legislative structure in the NHS which focuses 
on organisational performance rather than system working. The first phase of our research 
suggests that systems are concentrating on the development of relationships and governance 
arrangements to allow them to work effectively together to address their aims using the system 
form. Earlier studies (Charles et al., 2018, Walshe et al., 2018) found that ground work and 
preliminary activities had been at the centre of system and partnership working, and our 
findings suggest that this focus is enduring as STPs and ICSs work to increase their maturity.  
Difficulties reconciling existing organisational and service landscapes with system working 
existed within all case studies. Possible impacts were identified as duplication of effort, 
complexity of financial arrangements, reduced access to performance information, weakened 
incentives for co-operation and engagement, and communication difficulties. Our findings 
confirm those of earlier studies (Charles et al., 2018, Pett, 2020a, Moran et al., 2018) regarding 
the importance of ongoing efforts of systems to develop system governance which ‘goes with 
the grain’ of the local context, as a means to enabling meaningful engagement of local 
government in systems and places, and facilitating local governance arrangements which are 
clear and functional.   
Where there is confusion about decision making processes, partners perceive system 
governance structures as burdensome, duplicative and unclear. Systems are seeking to 
reconcile potentially competing interests in their governance arrangements: balancing 
representation, inclusivity and consensus with the need to act; the accommodation of both cross 
cutting pieces of work and issues specific to certain groups of organisations; and of the 
principle of subsidiarity and the need for system oversight. Measures being introduced include 
formalising governance structures to aid clarity, and proposals to streamline membership of 
governance forums, through the agreement of lead representative for groups of partners. ‘Soft’ 
power of network leadership and informal horizontal accountability is increasingly being 
supplemented by the incorporation of the existing governance architecture into system 
structures, including the incorporation of statutory decision-making forums into system 
governance, and the recruitment of system leaders who hold positions of authority in statutory 
bodies within the system.  
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An important aspect of the development of system governance is the co-ordination of decision 
making across system and place, and the reconciliation of local priorities with the wider 
priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. Interviewees acknowledged that it remains challenging 
to get the division of responsibilities “right” between levels. Place appears to be emerging as 
the scale at which the interaction between social care, primary/community and acute care takes 
place, where service integration is driven and the focus for improving population health. 
Standard setting and cross cutting work programmes meanwhile are driven at system scale 
(including workforce, IT, finance, maternity and cancer services). Commissioning 
organisations were exercising their statutory functions in the context of wider system working. 
moving beyond an organisational focus to make collaborative commissioning decisions on a 
pan-CCG footprint, and within places. 
Overall, systems are a challenging environment in which to make binding decisions, 
particularly those of a contentious nature. System partners are keen to collaborate, and embrace 
the opportunities for improved planning and provision of services which it is widely believed 
system working can offer.  However the realisation of this is challenging. Local government 
bodies were concerned about their potential exposure to financial risk, and loss of control over 
limited council resources. For NHS organisations, it appears that a shift from competition to a 
collaborative ethos is underway, but this is a long term undertaking.  Like Walshe (2018) we 
found that some interviewees still doubted that, given the current legislative environment, 
partners would prioritise the interests of the system above individual roles, accountabilities and 
statutory responsibilities when faced with decisions significantly against organisational 
interests. Notably however,  we found no evidence this conflict had been significantly tested 
in practice, partly as systems had yet to address contentious issues. At place level, agreements 
to formalise co-operative working and agreements to share risk, such as Alliance agreements, 
are under discussion but not yet widely implemented. The limited findings at this stage relating 
to the COVID-19 response suggest that the operational focus to system activities and the 
change in the financial regime may have facilitated collaboration and strengthened 
relationships between system partners. 
The question of how systems were accountable, to whom and for what was far from settled, 
with an increase in the number of actors with accountability relationships, emerging horizontal 
accountabilities between system partners, and a shift in the management of vertical 
accountabilities as systems matured. This developing landscape has made things unclear on the 
ground, with the potential for confusion in the way accountabilities flow between the system, 
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the regulator, providers and places. This finding is in line with earlier studies which highlight 
the lack of clarity about accountability arrangements (NHS Confederation, 2020, Moran et al., 
2018). A particular factor causing confusion among providers was the extent to which NHSEI 
contact with individual providers was being replaced by contact through the system. However, 
the shift in the emphasis in the relationship with NHSEI was welcomed, along with the 
opportunity for the development of assurance within systems.  
 
At the time of the fieldwork, action to achieve long term financial sustainability in the case 
studies had not been agreed or implemented. This was related to the need to first build 
constructive relationships and clear working arrangements between system partners, but was 
also related to wider factors such as an unsupportive wider regulatory and legislative context, 
and a perceived lack of power for system leaders to drive through unpopular decisions. Systems 
were starting to make use of opportunities to agree the allocation of central resources between 
partners, to develop shared resources in ways that had not been possible before, and to explore 
novel and unique initiatives based on system partnerships, but these types of initiatives were 
not yet common practice. As previous studies have suggested (Charles et al., 2018, Pett, 
2020a), interviewees wanted the resolution of the questions regarding the future legislative 
status of ICSs in order to clarify future direction. Current NHS financial targets for systems 
were viewed as unattainable, and unsupported by the wider regulatory context. Payment 
structures were altering to support collaboration. The national tariff was no longer a prominent 
method payment mechanism and blended payments were being introduced in some places.  
14.2 Discussion of interim findings  
 
The implications of the findings of this interim report should be considered in the context of 
the circumstances in which the data was gathered. Phase 1 of the fieldwork (conducted between 
December 2019 and March 2020), which forms the basis of this interim report, was cut short 
due to the COVID 19 pandemic. We were not able to interview all partners in our case studies. 
In particular, we had fewer interviews in Case Study 1 than intended. This restriction may have 
reduced nuance in the findings of this interim report. Additionally, the context in which ICSs 
and STPs are operating has changed significantly since Phase 1 of the fieldwork ended due to 
the changes associated with the COVID-19 response, such as to financial mechanisms. The 
policy, regulatory and legislative context is also subject to significant proposed change as 
detailed in Integrating Care: Next Steps to building strong and effective integrated care systems 
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across England (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020b), which not only sets out 
NHSEI’s proposals for legislative change, but also announces a series of practical changes 
anticipated to take place by April 2022, in order to transition to system working focused on 
further devolution to systems, greater partnership working at place and closer collaboration 
between providers on a larger footprint. It is important therefore that these interim findings are 
in due course considered in the light of the findings from the second phase of this research 
which is currently underway. Nevertheless, these interim findings are useful for both policy 
development and practice. 
The establishment of NHS structures at a regional level, and a reliance on collaboration are not 
novel approaches. Spatial ‘regions’ have also been a near constant – if constantly changing – 
feature within the organisation of healthcare (Lorne et al, 2019). Alongside the use of market 
mechanisms to promote competition in the NHS since the late 1980s, there has been a 
continuing reliance on collaboration, and a long history of local organisations working together 
under the co-ordination of commissioners. Therefore, STPs and ICSs do not mark a novel move 
towards collaboration. However, the development of STPs and ICSs does mark a significant 
shift in emphasis in NHS policy. By prioritising spatially-based co-operation over 
organisational competition, the emergence of ICSs raises questions about the future of the 
competition orientated Health and Social Care Act 2012, and a regulatory landscape focused 
principally on organisational autonomy, whilst also indicating the necessity for a return in some 
form to strategic regional or sub-regional oversight. The latter is unsurprising, given its salience 
in NHS history (Lorne et al, 2019). 
The question of how ICSs could be embedded in legislation or guidance is currently under 
discussion (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020b). The outcome of this is subject to 
considerable uncertainty. NHSEI’s initial proposals did not recommend establishing ICSs as 
formal statutory bodies, instead asking for legislation which would allow commissioners and 
providers to form decision making committees (a joint committee structure) which would direct 
the work of ICSs. However it has more recently been suggested that ICSs may be given the 
status of statutory bodies, possibly leading to the abolition of CCGs (Health Service Journal, 
2020). Our interim findings suggest that swift resolution of these questions regarding possible 
legislative change is needed in order to provide certainty to system members regarding ‘the 
rules of the game’.  We found that system partners were keen to collaborate, and embraced the 
possibilities offered by system working. However, the wider institutional context in the NHS 
at the time of Phase 1 of the research appeared instrumental in eroding trust between system 
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partners regarding the likelihood of collaborative behaviour in practice (despite a reported 
eagerness to embrace collaboration in principle). Likewise the uncertainty regarding the future 
status of ICSs appeared to threaten partners’ commitment to future system plans.  
Our interim findings suggest system governance structures are complex and subject to ongoing 
refinement. The iterative development of governance arrangements and time spent nurturing 
relationships can develop norms of trust and reciprocity between system partners which 
underpin increased collaborative working, and encourage fairness and adherence to system 
rules (Ostrom, 1994, Sydow, 1998, Gambetta, 1988). However, the ongoing refinement of 
system governance structures was also indicative of the complexity of governance 
arrangements, as systems sought to ensure representation and inclusivity, to work within the 
existing governance architecture of member organisations, and to ensure that where possible 
system decision making had formal status. Interestingly, as the case study systems’ governance 
structures developed as systems matured, they appeared to share characteristics with vertical 
governance structures, becoming increasingly formalised and hierarchical, for instance with 
approvals required at system level for some decisions made at place level. This may be a 
necessary by-product of the need to provide oversight and assurance as the systems take a 
greater share of responsibility for system performance. Recent NHSEI proposals for the future 
development of ICS governance formalise this as the required direction of travel, with 
requirements that all ICSs put in place firmer governance and decision making arrangements 
for 2021/22 to reflect growing roles and responsibilities (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 
2020b). These include the requirement that each ‘place’ formalises joined up decision-making 
arrangements for defined functions, and that systems define individual organisation 
accountability within the system governance framework (ibid.). 
 
The approaches being considered by our case study sites to streamline governance 
arrangements, and confer formality to system decisions should be critically considered as 
examples of the possibilities of formalising decision making within the current collective 
model of responsibility and decision-making. Proposals being considered in the case studies to 
streamline forum membership, such as through establishing ‘one voice for each place’, are 
predicated on strong local relationships and the existence of unity of voice amongst partners, 
both of which may not be realistic. Furthermore, the use of the ‘committee in common’ 
mechanism  to facilitate pan-organisation decision making is also not a panacea. This is 
primarily because it does not resolve the issue of organisational sovereignty, as each 
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represented organisation is making decisions separately and carries the power of veto. A further 
mechanism to streamline the organisational landscape and increase the status of system 
decisions was the appointment of CCG leaders to system leadership positions. Arguably, the 
amalgamation of leadership in this way, whilst increasing the power and responsibility of 
system leadership, may lead to confusion regarding accountability and decision making 
processes. It should be noted however, that this effect was not yet reported in our case studies. 
 
Due to the current non-statutory nature of STPs and ICSs, the dependence on goodwill and 
mutual co-operation,  and the non-binding nature of decision making in systems, contentious 
issues were not being addressed in the case study systems. The continued focus of systems on 
developing governance arrangements meant that, at the end of the first stage of fieldwork, the 
case study systems had yet to make significant headway regarding action to achieve long term 
sustainability, although there were indications that groundwork was being put in place, 
including the development of local payment mechanisms, formal agreements such as Alliance 
agreements, the development of approaches for agreeing the allocation of resources, and the 
development of shared resources.  The tracking of further progress in this regard will be an 
important element of the second stage of the fieldwork for this study. Our fieldwork ceased at 
the time when the health and local government response to COVID-19 was beginning in 
earnest, and this response has led to many changes in the context in which systems are 
operating. Furthermore the changes proposed by NHSEI in ‘Integrating care: Next steps to 
building strong and effective integrated care systems across England’ (NHS England and NHS 
Improvement, 2020b) suggest significant changes to the financial framework will be 
forthcoming with the finances of the NHS increasingly organised at ICS level. The second 
stage of our research will investigate the further development of STPs and ICSs in this greatly 
changing context. 
 
Our interim findings suggest that local context is very important in relation to system working. 
It is particularly important, given the aims of STPs/ICSs, that local arrangements are structured 
in such a way that facilitates the engagement of partners other than health, most significantly 
local government. Given the layering of system structures over local organisational landscapes, 
including various sizes and scales of organisations and diverse historical partnership 
arrangements, these local arrangements will necessarily be far from uniform. In the recent 
discussion document regarding possible legislative change, NHSEI is seeking to leave room 
for local discretion and flexibility regarding the way functions are discharged at different levels 
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(NHS England and NHS Improvement, 2020b). It is possible that in some systems working at 
system scale will always be limited, for instance where the system level seeks to unite multiple 
principal councils. In these instances it is expected that ‘place’ will be the scale at which 
partnership working between health and local government occurs. Notably however, it does 
not follow that, given the freedom to organise structures across systems and places, local 
systems will always establish structures which involve all partners. For example, in some of 
our case studies important partnership bodies such as Health and Wellbeing Boards and 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees did not appear to be significant bodies at either system or 
place level.  
The division of functions between systems and places emerged as a difficult process, in which 
decisions regarding the best scale for functions were not straightforward. Our case study 
systems were starting to address the need to formalise the division of functions during Phase 1 
of our fieldwork. Additionally, our case study systems were moving towards the creation of a 
single CCG which was coterminous with the system. There is still a role for commissioning at 
both system and place level, a function which requires that not all decisions are consensual and 
that a lead organisation is in place for reasons of accountability. The second phase of the 
research will focus on the relationship between system and place in more detail, including the 
development of commissioning functions at different system levels.  
Accountability is an increasingly important issue as systems mature. At the time of the Phase 
1 fieldwork, as NHSEI increasingly worked with and through systems to support improvement 
across the NHS, the nature of the emerging accountability relationships between system, 
regulator and system partners remained unclear to some system partners. This lack of clarity 
may be resolved by the anticipated new System Oversight Framework which will set out 
expectations of ICSs and the organisations within them (NHS England and NHS Improvement, 
2019d). The development of horizontal accountability arrangements is an important factor in 
the development of successful self-governance of collective resources (Ostrom, 1994).  While 
systems and places were developing the infrastructure for peer review, the capacity of system 
and place partners to hold each other to account appeared somewhat untested as yet.  
 
While there was an expectation on the ground that NHSEI would step back to a degree to allow 
primacy to the system, it did not appear in practice that contact between NHS providers and 
NHSEI had lessened. Indeed without legislative change, although ICSs may be treated as if 
they are accountable, the vertical accountability relationship lies between sovereign 
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organisations and NHSEI. At the time of the research, rather than streamlining assurance 
processes, the current approach appeared duplicative. The presence of NHSEI ‘alongside’ the 
system in system governance forums did not appear to serve an accountability function (as 
accountability is inherently retrospective) but could rather be understood as an ex ante 
mechanism of directing behaviour (Bovens, 2007) or, arguably, the development of a shared 
‘horizontal’ accountability with system leadership. This ‘alongside’ approach between system 
leaders and NHSEI also raises questions regarding the ‘decision space’ (Bossert, 1998) 
available to systems in practice, and the degree of autonomy systems have to autonomously 
develop plans, allocate resources, and define programs and services.  
 
14.3 Outline of phase two of the research 
The second phase of data collection has commenced. We are interviewing partners of a selected 
‘place’ within the STP or ICS of each case study to find out how the relationship between place 
and system is developing. In particular we wish to find out the types of function evolving at 
different system levels, including commissioning, whether ICSs/STPs are able to allocate 
resources more efficiently across sectoral boundaries, the development of payment 
mechanisms and more complex forms of contracting, and the reconciliation of local and system 
priorities. There will also be a further round of system member interviews at a later date, and 
we intend to approach representatives of the regional NHSEI function in each case study to 
request an interview. The second phase of the research will seek to address the following 
research questions in particular in greater depth:  
1) How statutory commissioning organisations including local authorities are facilitating 
local strategic decisions and their implementation; and whether different types of 
commissioning function are evolving at different system levels. 
2) Whether ICSs or their successors are able to allocate resources more efficiently across 
sectoral boundaries and bring their local health economies into financial balance.  
3) Which mechanisms are used to commission services in ICSs. In particular, how is 
competition used to improve quality and/or value for money of services; and are more 
complex forms of contract (such as alliancing) being used? How are local organisations 
reconciling new service configurations with current/evolving pricing structures, and 
thus how are financial incentives being used? 
4) How locality priorities, including those of local authorities, are reconciled with the 
wider priorities embodied in STPs and ICSs. In particular, how is co-ordination 
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achieved between STP and ICS plans, local priorities and existing programmes of work 
such as any local new models of care? 
5) How national regulators are responding to the changes in modes of planning and 
commissioning and actual service configurations, in the light of the changed priorities 
for these regulators set out in the LTP. 
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